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INTRODUCTION
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the event which hurled t he
United States into the t hroes of the Second World War, convinced many
mi lit ary st r ategists that prec autions should be t aken to guard the West
Ca nst against possible invasion.

The erection of a formidable defense

system along the coast was complicated by t he fact that 110,000 J apanese
lived in Wa shington , Oregon, and California, a situati on t hat could be
har dly ignored by a suspicious public who rapidly formed the opinion
that most Japanese-Americans har bored disloyal attitudes and would pr ove
to be a menace to the war effort unless measures «ere immediately taken
to re st rict their activities.
"Experts" agreed that it would be impossible to sepa r ate the loyal
from the disloyal Japanese on an individua l basis.

Milit ary leaders

finally decided that the danger of sabotage necessit ated the removal of
a ll Japanese from the West Coast, thus eliminating in one stroke the
thre at of subversion .

During the fall of 1942, 110,000 Japanese-Americans

we r e evacuated from t he coastal st ates and placed in ten detention camps
situated in desolate regions of seven Western states.

The or iginal

purpose of the relocation centers was to expedite resettlement, enabling evacuated Japanese to return to civilian society (outside the restricted West Coast region) a s soon as t heir loyalty could be det e rmined,
but t he majority of evacuees remained in centers for t he duration of
the >ta r.
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This narrative is concerned with the Minidoka Relocation Center
which was located in south-east Idaho.

This center was in operation

from August of 1942 until October of 1945.

Since all relocation centers

were governed according to a fixed policy, it may be assumed that the
history of Minidoka is representative of other relocation centers.
Since the hysteria engendered by the war has gradually subsided,
historians can now evaluate the facts of the relocation movement from a
more objective position.

The decision of our government to effect re-

location was without precedent.

Its uniqueness lends weight to the argu-

ment that it is of considerable significance.
The constitutional questions involved in relocation are obvious,
and many post-war historians are of the opinion that relocation was
illegal and unjustifiable.

The author neither condemns nor defends

relocation since the ramifications of this problem are too complex to
be dealt with in this text.

It is possible to criticize the relocation

program in light of the facts that are now available, but it becomes
understandable when circumstances leading up to the decision are care-

fully analyzed.

OlAPTER I
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JAPANESE RELOCATION CENTERS
The events and forces which led to the establishment of J apanese
relocation centers during the Second World War were partially determined by the pre-war position of the Japanese ethnic group in American
society.l

These people lived together in communities and created a

distinct sub-culture which became a conspicuous target for racists end
other groups that were offended by the intrusion of this "alien• minority
into the American environment.

The "peculiarity• of this foreign society

engendered feelings of resentment end prejudice which later exploded
into intense hat red soon after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor.
Having recently arrived in en unfamiliar country, J apanese immigrants were hesitant to relinquish their old ways of life, since pride
in their Oriental heritage dissuaded them from freely adopting Western
attitudes and modes of existence.

Assimilation was greatly retarded

because of the many fundamental dissimilarities which separated these
two cultures.

Such ethnological incongruities could not be readily

reconciled by the first generation Japanese.

linformation for this chapter was derived fr om the following
sources: Barnhart, Edward N., "The Individual Exclusion of Japanese
Americans in World War II," Pacific Historical Review; Tani, Henry,
"The Nisei Since Pearl Harbor," The Pacific Spectator, I (Spring,
1947), 207-21?; United states Department of Interior, WRA: A story
of Human Con servation , Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office,
1946; United states De partment of Interior, WRA: Impounded People-Japanese Americans in t he Relocation Centers, Washington, D.C.,
Government Prinhng Ofi'J.ce, 1946.
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Japanese a liens usually congregated in settlements along the Western
Coast.

still clinging to Nipponese customs and beliers, they attempted

to preserve the attitudes and institutions which were venerated in
their mother country.

Language schools were established, and clubs

and organizations perpetuated native practices and rituals.

Consequently

the second generation was able to absorb many or the culture patterns
which had been transplanted by their parents.

This condition naturally

impeded amalgamation and isolated the Japanese from the rest or American
society .
Japanese-Americans are commonly divided into two categories; the
original immigrants, or first generation Japanese, are called the Issei,
while the second generation is referred to as the Nisei.
consists of native-born residents of the United States.

The latter class
The Isaei,

barred from United States citizenship by the Oriental Exclusion Act of
1907. were hesitant to depart rrom thoae ways or lire with which they
were familiar.

The Nisei, however, adapted to American customs much

more readily and, unlike their parents, learned to speak English.
Although these people were industrious and conscientious workers,
many occupations were closed t o them because certain groups resented
their competition.

Consequently the Japanese gravitated toward those

endeavors which seemed to promise them relatively unhindered advancement.

It

~<as

also expedient for them to pursue a line of work in which

they were already proficient.

Therefore, many turned to agriculture,

while othe rs be c ame engaged in t he handling of Far Eastern commodities.
The Nisei who entered the l atter occupation frequently returned to Japan
in order to develop a more comprehensive background in the field of
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Oriental trade.

Such educational sojourns were later to take on sinister

implications in the eyes of some American patriots.
The intense feelings of prejudice towards persons of Japanese
parentage that rose after the beginning of World War II had a definite
foundation, since many pressure groups had for years been antagonistic
toward Japanese-Americans.
~est,

The Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden

The American Legion, and The Associated Farmers of California,

as well as some politicians, had long resented the presence of the
J apanese .

The Hearst press had campaigned for years against the "Yellow

Peril" which was supposedly trying to engulf the world.

Thus, this

movement manifested itself long before World War II, although its promoters were yet a minority group.
Hysteria Following Pearl Harbor
The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, served to give
impetus and momentum to these anti-Japanese factions, since their prejudice now had a tangible basis.

Acting as a catalyst, this event ac-

celerated the development of these forces of resentment and animosity,
unifying them into a formidable bloc.
I mmediate ly after Pearl Harbor, rumors as to Issei and Nisei collusion with t he enemy were rampant, and it was believed by many that a
fifth column movement of Japanese nationalists had betrayed the country
by revealing strategic information to the enemy.

These rumors were

thought to be supported by the fact that the invaders seemed to know
the precise location of United States military installations in the
Hawa iian I slands.

Even though such stories we re unsubstentiat•d, t h ey
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exerted a definite influence on the public, supporting the convictions
of those who believed that people of Japanese ancestry were not to be
tru sted.
During the months following Pearl Harbor, the national government
took measures to prevent anticipated sabotage on the West Coast, since
it was believed that this area contained potential saboteurs.

Aliens

were required to register with t he government, receiving identification
cards whi ch were to be carried at all times.

Certain articles in the

po ssessi on of a lien s were conside red contr aband; cameras, radios, and
guns were seized a s a result of raids made by federal agents.

An eight

o'clock curfew was imposed upon person of Japanese descent, and they
>~ere

not a llowed to venture beyond a five-mile radius from their homes.
An intensive search for enemy supporters was conducted, and a liens

believed to be disloyal were arrested.

There were those who did not

think the F.B.I. was successfully combating t he threat of espionage,
and authorities in California received incessant phone calls from patriotic citizens reporting the suspicious activities of their Orienta l
neighbors.
The newspapers reported the arrests and seizures that were being
made in ever-increasing numbers.

These articles naturally enhanced the

growing opinion that a subversive element existed in the population.
Editorials also appeared which intensified this phobia.
The presence of Japanese in t h e vicinity of seaports, r ailways,
ai rfields, and nava l bases convinced mil itary aut ho rities that a liens
were preparing to subvert the war effort.

It was as sumed that they

had infiltrated these strategic areas deliberately, preparing for a
campaign of wide and general devastation.

Although socio-economic
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forces had actually determined the confines of Japanese settlements,
suspicious patriots considered this to be an ominous sign of infiltration and impending sabotage.
other manifestations seemed to suggest that a conspiracy existed.
The presence of American-raised Nisei in Japan appeared to be a definite
indication of traitorous dealings, even though they had journeyed to
that country for the purpose of receiving an advanced education in the
field of Oriental trade.

On February 4, 1942, Senator Guy Gillette of

Iowa asserted that certain Japanese societies were posing a s cultura l
clubs and chambers of commerce.

Hiding behind a facade of respectability,

these subversive organizations, he claimed, collaborated with the enemy
and p lotted unknown mischief.
The fact that sabotage had not yet occurred did not reduce the
mounting tension.

It was believed that saboteurs were patiently waiting

for an opportune moment to strike, meanwhile making prep arations for a
concerted attack.

This fear was expressed by Earl Warren, Attorney

General of California:
If we think
l iving in a
a real plan
is the most

sabotage has not been p lanned for us, we are
fool's paradise. The most convincing proof of
is the fact we have had no sabotage yet. This
ominous sign.l
Evacuation

In early February of 1942, diverse pressure groups clamored for

the complete evacuation of a ll Japanese from the West Coast, insisting

lSalt Lake Tribune, February 22, 1942.
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that counter-espionage activities had failed to arrest the threat of
subversion and intrigue.

A committee of Pacific Coast Congressmen,

led by California Senator Hiram Johnson, pressed earnestly for this plan
of eviction, advising President Roosevelt that this solution would erase
the existing menace.

The Hearst press active l y supported the total

removal of Japanese from the Coast, predicting that race riots and
violence would ensue if this minority group was allowed to remain in
the midst of growing public hostility.

The House Committee on Un-Ameri-

can Activities expressed its concern over the Japanese problem, proposing
that these people be removed to an isolated inland region.
offered more radical suggestions.

Other groups

The American Legion in California

and the Native Sons of the Golden West demanded that all Japanese-Americans
be re pat riated.
These solutions were founded on the argument that the Japanese were
a mysterious and treacherous people, which made it impossible to separate
the loyal from the disloyal on an individual basis.

It was also pointed

out that under Japanese law, a child born of Japanese parents was automatically a citizen of Japan, regardless of his place of birth .

This

created the problem of dual citizenship, which many believed would tend
to foster disloyalty.

Army General John De Witt expressed the feelings

of many when he declared that Japanese-Americans could never be trusted
because they were members of an enemy race.
In the war in which we a re now engaged r acial affinities
are not se ve red by migration. The Japanese race is an
enemy r ace, and while many second and t hird generation
Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United
States Citizenship, have become "Americanized," t he
r aci al strains are undiluted.l

lEugene Rostow, "Our Worst liartime Mistake, • Harper's Magazine,
CXCI (September, 1945), P• 195 ·
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Those who questioned t he legality of such a drastic decree were
silenced by the general hysteria.
to justify such extreme action.

The need for inte rnal security seemed
This meant, of course, that rights

guaranteed by the Constitution would have to be suspended.
that a r acia l group could

b~

The concept

presumed to possess subversive ideas which

would require its imprisonment was unique, but the emergency engendered
by the war superseded all

consid~>ration

of minority rights.

The fol-

lowing editorial comment expressed the growing fear that citizenship and
civil rights were serving to protect insidious enemy sympathizers, "Enemy
a liens, potential spies and preachers of disloyalty live in security and
carry on their nefarious activities under the flimsy protection of papers
and citizenship.•l
On February 19, 1942 , Pr esi dent Roosevelt yielded to the pleas of
military advi sors and pressure groups.

The President issued an executive

order which authorized generals to establish restricted military areas
from which they could expe l all persons considered dangerous to the
national security.

John De Witt, Commanding General of the Western

Defense Command, immediately decl ared that mass expulsion of JapaneseP~ricans

from the Coast was a military necessity.

He justified this

decision by stating that there was:
• no ground for assuming that Japanese-Americans will not
turn against the United States. It therefore follows that
along t he vital Pacific Co a st over 112,000 potential enemies,
of J apanese extracti on, are at large today. There are disturbing indic ations th at t hese are organized and ready for
concerted action at a favorable opportunity. The very fact
t hat no sabotage has taken pl ace to date is a disturbing and
confirming indication that such action will be taken.2

lsalt J!ake _Tribune, February 2~, 1942.
2Rostow, op.cit., p. 196.
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Thus, military authorities were convinced that there was not time to
conduct individual investigations.

Only mass evacuation would completely

eliminate the danger.
Armed with the executive order issued by Roosevelt, General De Witt
on March 2, announced that all Japanese would be removed from an area
which extended about one hundred miles inland along the Pacific Coast.
This sweeping decree meant that 112,000 Japanese would have to leave this
forbidden zone, including men, women, and children.
les s than a month to leave .

They were given

All J apanese remaining along the Co a st afte r

March 29, were to be arrested.
The
ment.

Jap~ese

reacted to this decree with bitterness and disillusion-

The prospect of being uprooted and driven from their communities

was terrifying, and it was small comfort to know that they would face
the future in the company of friends and relatives.

Evacuation was sup-

posed to be voluntary, but it was impossible for the majority of Japanese
to make this exodus in the time limit allowed.

Many desperately tried

to sell their property and possessions, close out their businesses, and
liquidate their assets.

This was done in the greatest of haste, and the

result was confusion and chaos.

In order to expedite the operation,

the government offered to give financial assistance to the emigree,
but by this time the Japanese were understandably distrustful of the

I'
government.

I

Within three weeks following the fatal proclamation, 8,000 Japanese
began the long march eastward.

Other areas, however, did not readily

welcome these unfortunate migrants.

Many states were reluctant to re-

ceive people who were considered by the military authorities to be potential spies.

Some we re intercepted along the Arizona border and

ll

advised to venture elsewhere.
through the state.

Kansas patrolmen would not let them pass

Nevada and Wyoming refused to admit these people

who belonged to the "enemy race."

Former Governor Clyde Tingley of

New Mexico expressed his disapproval of invading Japanese evacuees in
the most offensive language.
11

"California can keep her Japs," he said,

as far as I 1 m concerned I would rather give General MacArthur a dozen

more planes and send all the Japs here to the Bataan Peninsula. 111
Governor Maw of Utah had a more tolerant attitude; he allowed migrating
Japanese to settle in the state on the condition that they remain in
. I

remote regions, and the local residents had no objections.
It soon became obvious that the plan of voluntary evacuation was
unworkable, and a more realistic solution was sought.

The migration

of so many unwanted persons had an undesirable effect, since it was
difficult for the wandering Japanese to obtain employment or proper
living accomodations.

By the end of March random evacuation was dis-

continued.
The Establishment of Relocation Centers
A compulsory system of internment was inaugurated, designed to
expedite the evacuation process.

Thi s comprehensive plan called for

the creation of detention centers where the displaced Japanese could
be temporarily confined.

The Wartime Civil Control Administration

I,

j,

(W.C.C.A.), which had recently been established by De Witt, supervised
this new plan of systematized evacuati on.

As a result of this change

I

in po licy, the Japanese remaining in the forbidden military zones were

lsslt Lake Tribune, March 6, 1942.
I

l;

f
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instructed to proceed to guarded camps called assembly centers.

These

camps served as temporary internment areas where the evacuees were kept
under surveillance until more permanent relocation centers could be
erected.

These assembly centers, located at various places along the Coast,
had been hastily built to accommodate the displaced Japanese.

Within

two months one hundred thousand people were herded into eighteen of
these wretched enclosures.
built barracks.

They lived a communal existence in rudely

Cramped quarters de prived them of all privacy, and

they were subjected to a life of regimentation and restriction.

The

prisoners were forbidden to converse in Japanese; roll calls and searches
were conducted daily.

All visitors were carefully screened, and guards

probed for contraband.
However, the Japanese endured this humiliating treatment with patience
and forbearance.
and hobbies.

Some occupied their time by working at different crafts

A recreation program helped to prevent idleness, and a

makeshift educational program was instituted and administered by the
evacuees.

These occupations enlivened an otherwise routine existence.

Meanwhi le, the War Relocation Authority (W.R.A.) was busily erecting
pe rmanent relocation centers which were situate d in desolate are as in
se ven Western states.

Although most of these states had protested the

presence of these settlements in their domain, the relocation plan was
eventually put into operation.

These centers were located in federally-

owned regions of Arkansas, California, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Utah,
and Wyoming.

According to the tentative evacuation policy of the War

Relocation Authority , the Japanese were to be confined in these crude
villages for the remainder of the war, or until they could be examined

individually.

They would be rele ase d only after their loyalty could

be definitely determine d.
By November of 1942 , all the displaced Japanese ha d been re moved
from the assemb ly area s, pl aced in t r ains, and transported to the relocation centers.

These camps we re heavily guarded and enclosed by barbed-

wire, accommodating 7,000 to 18 ,000 people each .

The majority of the

evacuees we re destined to remain in these compact tarpaper communit ies
for the re mainder of the we.r .

Table L

War Relocati on Cente r sa

Name of Center

Location

Opening Date

Manzanar

Manzanar, Inyo County, Cali fo rni a

March 21, 1942

Colorado River

Poston, Yuma County, Arizona

May 8 , 1942

Tule Lake

Newe ll , Hodoc County, California

May 27, 1942

Gil a River

Rivers, Pinal County, Arizona

July 20, 1942

l'd.ni doka

Hunt, Jerel!» County, Idaho

August 10, 1942

Heart Mountain

Heart Mountain, Park County, Wyoming

August 12 , 1942

Granada

Amache, Prowers County, Colorado

August 27 , 1942

Centra l Utah

Topaz, Millard County, Utah

September ll, 1942

Rohwer

McGehee, Desha County, Arkansas

September 18 , 1942

Jere~~»

Denson, Drevr and Chicot Counties,
Arkansas

Octobe r 6, 1942

9
United States Department of Interior, WRA: A story of Human
Conservation (Washington D.C. , Government Printing Office, 1946), P• 197·

The eva cuation of the West Coast was only the first phase of the
rel ocat ion program.

The re settlement of the evacuees after they had
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been moved to the centers was the next major goal of the WRA.

However,

military authorities were slow in implementing a policy of rapid resettlement, preferring to keep the majority of Japanese-Americans behind barbed
wire where they could be kept under close surveillance.

I.

CHAPTER II
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MINIDOKA RELOCATION CENTER
In April of 1942, the War Relocation Authority set asi de 68,000
a cres of arid land in a desol ate area of south-central Idaho for the
establishment of the ~unidoka Relocation Center . 1

This northernmost

colony was situated between the Sawtooth range of mountains and t he Snake
River in a wilderness of sageb rush and sand.

The site was at an eleva-

tion of ),800 feet, near the to1.ns of Twin Fa ll s, Rupert , and Jerome.
The climate in this re gion is extremely var i ab le.

The summers a re dry

and uncomfort ab ly warm, while during the winter months subfreezing days
and nights are not uncommon. 2

The growing season is relatively short,

but the soi l is fertile and, if properl y irrigated, is capable of supporting a wide variety of c rops.
Construction
Construction began at Minidoka in the e a rly summer of 1942.

A crew

of 3,000 men under the supervision of the Army Engineers hastily erected
over 500 wooden buildings.

The community was divided into thirty-five

blocks of geometrically arranged barr ack s, sp r awling over an ar ea that
was three and a half miles long and one mile wide.

linform~tion for this chapter was de rived from t he following
sources : Minidoka Irrigator; Stafford, Ha rry L. , "Project Director's
Natt ative,• Minidoka Relocation Center, Hunt, Idaho; Twin Falls Times
2During the winter of 1942, Rupert recorded a low of 21 degrees
below zero; in July of the same year the temperat ure re ached a high
of 104 degrees.
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Ea ch block in the residenti a l section ha d f i f teen barra cks and was
de s igned to function as a social unit.

One building was to serve as a

r e cre ation ha ll ; one incorporated a l aundry room and a bathhouse; one
wa s to be used as a dining hall.
share the se f acilities.

Block residents would be required to

The remaining twelve house s we re divided into

s i x one-ro om apa rtments.

A block was cap able of accommod ating 250 people.

Rect angular barracks were partitioned to serve a s apartment houses for
the eva cuee s .

The city was to be equipped with a hospital, an administra-

ti on building , fire stations , sch ools, a library , a newspaper office ,
and a post office.
The Arriva l of Eva cuees
Most of t h e evacuees who were sent to Minidoka originally resided
in Wa shington and Oregon.

Following DeWitt's decision to implement a

compulsory system of evacuation, assembly camps were set up in these
states.

Improvised fairgrounds adjacent to Se attle served as the Puyallup

Assembly Center and contained over 7,000 Japanese by July of 1942 .
Portland Assembly Center held over ) ,000.
while the community of

~linidoka

The

Evacuees lived in these camps

was under construction.

In August and

September of 1942, the Japanese colonists were removed from these assembly camps and transported by rail to the Minidoka Relocation Center.
An a dvanced group of 213 Japanese arrived at Minidoka on August 10,

1942 , having volunteered to prepare the center for occupancy.!

!Minidoka Irrigator, August

5, 1944, p. 2.

r
I
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On August 16, a second group or Japanese rrom the Portland Assembly
Center arrived at Minidoka arter a train ride that was described by
one colonist as being "dirty, wearying, and comrortless. " 1

During

the next three weeks, train loads or J apanese arrived almost daily,
and by the end or August the center contained 3,700 evacuees.
September 13, the mass movement was al most completed.

By

The population

was now approaching 9,500, and ¥dnidoka was now the eighth largest
city in Idaho. 2
The rollowing schedule lists the arrival dates and size or the
various groups of colonists who were relegated to the Minidoka Relocation Center during August and September or 1942.

Table 2.
Date of Arrival
August
August
August
August
August
August
August
August
August
August

lO

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

3D
31

A:-rival Date and Size or Group a
Size or Group
213
493
516
508
524
511
525
516
517
512

Date of Arrival
September
September
September
September
September
September
Se ptembe r
September
September
September
September

1
2

3

4
5
6
7
8
10
ll

14

Size or Group
503
525
505
412
297
500
494
501
506
317
92

a Minidoka Reloc ation Center, "Hi story of Htmt, 11 August l, 1944,
P· 2.

lMinidoka Irrigator, September 25, 194 3, P• 2.
2Twin Falls Times, Octo ber 4, 1942, p. 3·

l
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Problems of Settlement
Since the project was only part ially completed when t he evacuees
a rrived, the settlement period of Minidoka's history
confusion and suffe ring .

>~as

fraught with

Many of the barracks were unfinished, and

for many mont hs the housing problem prevented the colonists from becoming prope rly situated .

The sewage system had not yet been in st alled,

and the inhabitants \iere forced to use unsanitary outdoor l atrines .l
A short age of stoves and co al caused conside r able distress during the
winte r months. 2

There was no hot water, and the water that was avail-

ab l e contained so much chlorine that it was practically undrinkable. 3
Mess halls were not supplied with sufficient cooking f aci lities, and
some r esidents we re compelled to dine in neighboring dining halls .

These

wretched condit ions were not noticeably improved for several weeks .

The housing shortage was perhaps the most perplexing problem of
the occupancy period, since it made orderly settlement impossible.

The

Superintendent of Housing described the futil i ty of trying to find adequate shelt e r for the arriving evacuees:

lwa r Relocation Authority, Third Quarter l y Report, Oct . 1 to

Dec. 1 , 1942. P • 61.
2Spicer, E. H. , "Report on an Uno r ganized Relocation Center,"
Project Analysis Series No. 6, Community Ana l ysis Section. p. 6.
3y~nidoka Irri gator, September 25 , 1943.

p . 4.
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August 22, 1942 was the most miserable day of my life.
The a r my's 500 people, mostly family groups, were moved
in and I had exactly nine apartments available. I put
the nine l argest families in the apartments and then had
to dump the rest of t he f ami lies into recreation halls
and dormitories. The mess was terrific.l
The housing office staff was constantly harr asse d by irate J apanese
demanding private quarters.

Families that did not have private apart-

ments shared rooms with strangers, and recreation halls were temporarily
used as bachelors' quarters.2

Residents of one block were forced to

move after the administ r ation decided to convert their apartments into
schoo lro oms, whereupon t he evicted Jap anese armed themselves with knive s
and axes, marched to the housing office, and threatened the staff.?
The housing situation remained critical for many months, and the last
barracks were not finished until t he middle of December.
Since the WRA was unwilling to supp ly furniture for apartments,
residents were compelled to build their own.

The most simp l e materi als

were used, and improvised cre ations were fashioned out of discarded
scraps of ••co d and even sagebrush .

They filched l umber from unguarded

stockpiles, absconded with bits of wood, and managed to piece together
rude chai rs, tables, cabinets, and other furnishings with considerable
skiU.4

lHuyche, Lorne, "Moving and Housing," November 12, 1942.

p . 1.

2Privacy was at such a minimum in some of the unpartitioned barracks
that women refused to undress when the time came to r etire.
) "Statistical Functional Report of Community Government," Final
Report of' Chairman of the Connnunity Council. Compiled by I. Oyama.
4Minidoka Irrigato r, September 25, 194).

p. 4.
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Beautification
The WRA had made no attempt to beautify the premises.
was tot a lly devoid

o~

vegetation (aside

~rom

The cente r

clumps of gnarled sage-

brush), and the tre e l ess , shrubless, dusty streets and sidewalks, and
barren plots of gr ound gave t his war-born city a grim and bleak appearance.
The thick l aye r of dust which cove red the ground became quite menacing
when stirred by wind, trucks, or mischievo us children.
1·1as going to be their home
re~ sed

~o r

an

inde~inite

Since lfd.nidoka

period of time, residents

to tolerate these con ditions, and immediately embarked upon a

campa ign t o improve the appe arance

o~

The colonists experience d great
quant ity of vegetation.

the cente r.
di~ficulty

in obtaining a suitable

Some had brought little plants to the center.

Vines, ferns, and perhap s a few flowers were

c are~lly

p l ant ed a long the sidewalks and between the barr a cks. 1

nourished and
Grass was planted

in many a r eas, and a f ew l arge trees, donat ed by t houghtful J e rome and
Twin Fa ll s residents, we re brought into the center. 2

The search for

g reenery was extensive.
They ~<an dered into the sagebrush and walked a l ong t he irrigati on cana l bordering t he center . Bit by bit they brought home
clump s of gr ass , mint p l ants, c att ai l reeds, and willows.
Some found cactus and desert moss • • • 3
Di verse for ms of vegetation we re pl a ced in gardens watered by a se ries
o~

irrigation canals.

The beautification

o~

Minidoka helped to cam-

oufl age the severe nat ure of t he community.

l Hosokawa, Robert,

11

~linidoka Report No . 9, " Oct obe r 29 , 1942 . p . 1.

2rwin Fa ll s Times, April 12 , 1943.
3Hosok e.,.,a, Robert, op. cit.

p . 1.

22

There were disturbing indications that the barracks existance,
with its crowded living quarters and unsanitary toilet facilities, was
having an adverse effect upon the general health of the community.
first large scale epidemic occurred on September 23, 1942. 1

The

Over 60

persons were hospitalized due to an outbreak of ptomaine poinsoning in
one of the mess halls.

~lidespread

intestinal flu plagued the colonists.

In February of 1943, several residents 1-rere found to be infected with
gonorrhea.

Since male residents did not have the disease, doctors con-

cluded that outdoor latrines transmitted the infection. 2

Ironically,

a st ate health inspector visited Minidoka in November of 1942, and reported that conditions were •entirely satisfactory.•?

The daily diet of the colonists may have been wholesome, but it
was decidedly monotonous.

The WRA insisted that expenditures for food

should not exceed $.45 per day per person.

As could be imagined, few

were satisfied with the daily diet and the way the food was prepared .
The foll owing quote

~<ould

seem to indicate that the food

~<as

not too

appealing:
The food was horrible from first to l ast. We had the usual
45 cent per day per person food allowance but they could
never spend more than 25 or 26 cents. The full measure ~<as
ordered but the food just wasn't moved in. The result was

lJ4inidoke. Irrigator, September 25, 1942.
2•Minidoke. Report No. 2), 11 February 12, 194;>.
3Twin Falls Times, November 12, 1942.

2;5
slop . The ba rbage cans were always ful l. One day at
supper, ten young men walked into the mess hall, sat
do>m, and >Then there -[sic] food >ras served, got up without testing it, walked out to the garb age pails, and
dUl!lped their food in.l
A food rationing program 1rent into effect in December of 1942 ,
imposing further restrictions upon the variety and quantity of food t hat
was served.

As a result the Ydnidoka

Irri~ator

reported that, •we are

feel ing t he far-reaching arms of the government's r ationing program,
There is le ss of almost every conceivable food item on the menus, particularly sugar, meat, milk, butter, and eggs. 112
Aside from these shortages, the task of feeding 9,000 people was
formid able, a situation that was further complicated by the f act that
mess halls were not supplied with sufficient cooking facilities when the
evacuees first arrived .

In November of 1942, the follo >ring amounts of

food were consumed daily:

4,000 pounds of rice, 900 gallons of milk,

5,500 pounds of meat, 4,4oo loaves of bread, and 1,126 dozen eggs.:5
Thirty-five mess halls were needed to handle this ope ration.
cooked on co al-burning
dishes we re served.

Ar~

stoves.

Food was

Both Japanese and American-style

First generation J apanese preferred Japanese food

while the Nisei were quite satisfied >rith American food.
The fence incident
I n November of 1942, an incident occurred 1·1hich disrupted the
peace of the col!1lllUility.

Much to the amazement of the colonist s ,

l Huyche, Lorne, op. cit., p. 2 .
2¥unidoka Irrigator, January 2, 194).
5rbid., November 14, 1942.

>~orkers

24
began to erect a barbed wire fence a round the pe rimeter of the city .
Eight watch

to~ters

were also raised, and !ld.nidoka rapidly took on the

appear ance of a. concentration camp .

Although the administration claimed

that the watch towers would be used as fi re lookouts , the inhabitants
were convinced that they were designed to a serve a sinister purp ose . l
The barbed wire fence was als o more than "a. line of demarcation of the
cente r limits. 112

It was symoblic of thei r imprisoned state.

Most of

the inhabitants had felt from the be ginning that the Japanese exclusion
order was unconstitutional , and they did not think that they should be
regarded as p ri sone rs or subjected to humiliating treatment.
As the fence was raised, astonishment a.mcng the re si dents soon gave
>~ay

to resentment, and r esentment to outrage .

The Japanese be lieved that

they had been on their honor to remain within the city limits . ?

This

barrier now compe lled them to do so, and t hey began to feel like prisoners.
Some of the more aggressive coloni sts, in order to emphasize the fact
that the residents would not sit idly by while their fr ee doms were being
curtailed, retaliated by cutting the wire and upro oting the f encepo st s .
The contractor who wa s responsible for the completion of the f ence was
disturbed by these overt acts of sabotage, and r esponded by attaching e.
gene r ato r s to the barbed •are, giving it an electric cha r ge.
done

~<itho ut

This was

the knowledge or consent of the a dministration, but it

immediately pre cipitate d a crises.

News of the e lectrified fence spread

l Minidoka Irrigato r, Octo be r 51, 1942.
2Ibid ., November 7, 1942. P • 1.

3u. s.

Wa r Relocation Authority, "Proje ct Analysis Ser ies No . 4, 11
April, 194 ). P• 2 .

~I
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rapidly, and the residents were on the verge of riot.l

The generator

was disconnected as soon as the Project Director was informed; however,
the Japanese could not be easily pacified.
the fence legally were pursued.

Various attempts to combat

The Fair Labor Board decided to campaign

against its presence, and the residents of several blocks met and agreed
to take the issue to the WRA. 2

The administration apologized for this

unfortunate occurrence but was careful to warn the people that the destruction of government property was a serious offense.

Construction of

the fence was resumed.
Summary of the Occupational Period
The occupational period of Minidoka's history was, for most residents, an unmitigated ordeal accompanied by reel suffering, but it was
endured 1rlth a minimum of resistance or complaint.
the most part cooperated with the rumunistration .
riotous demonstrations were unknown.

The r esidents for
Excessive demands end

As long as the Japanese had ade-

quate food and shelter and were treated justly, a discipline problem was
non-existent.

Ho>~ever,

protests were voiced at infrequent intervals,

usually when the administration or the WRA imposed unwarranted measur es
that indicated hostility or contempt towards the Japanese.

Although it

took several months for conditions to become relatively settled, the
evacuees Here determined to transform Minidoka into a progressive community.

lu. S. War Relocation Authority, Project Analysis Series No . 4, 11
April, 1945, P• 2.
2Minidoka Irrigato r, November 18, 1942.

CHAPTER III
THE

ESTABLISH~::ENT

OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND SERVICES

Soon after t h e last g roup of evacuees a rr ived at Minidok a, a comprehensive pro gr am, outlined by the \1RA, was set into operation by the
project a dmini s tration.! The pl an c a lled for the establishment of social,
economic, po litic a l, and educational institutions.

These organizations

,.1e r e designed to r a ise the reloco.tion center from t he status of a r e fugee
camp to that of a progressive civilian comrnunity.2

Self-government
Early in September the Project Directo r, Ha rry st a fford, reve a led
a p l an t hrough '·1hic h t h e re sidents of Minidoka could establish a system
of sel f -government.

According to a p re s cri be d procedure, popul a rly

elected delegates appointed a committee of seven men who in turn ;1e re
to draft a charte r.

This con stit ut ion would become effective only after

it was app roved by the 11RA and submitted to the colonists for r atific a tion.

Many J apane se were skeptic a l of the p ropos a l beca use eva cuee

lrnfo r mation f o r t h i s chapte r was derived f rom the follo >ling
Source s : "Hi st oric a l Narrative Re port of the Community Manageme nt
Di vision: Educ ation Section, Mi nidoka P ro ject Schoo ls, • 11ar Reloca tion Center , Hunt, Idaho , Decembe r 15, 1945; Sakoda, Jarnes, ~unidoka:
An Ana l ysis of Cnangi ng Po.t terns of So ci a l I ntero.cti on, an unpub l ished
Ph.D . dissert at ion, Un iversity of Ca lifornia , 1955; Spi cer, E. H.,
"Report on an Unorganized Re loc ation Cent e r , • Pr oject Analysis Series
No . 6, Co=nity Analysis Section.
2spi c e r, E. H., "Re po rt on an Unorganized Re l o c ation Center,"
Pro ject Analysis Series No. 6, Community Analysis Section. ~ · 1.

l

'
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government would necessarily be subordinate to the WRA.

Nevertheless,

under the guidance of the administration, steps were taken toward instituting responsible government.
Early efforts to establish a system of self-government at Minidoka met with little success due to general public apathy and what can
only be regarded as obstruction on the part of the administration.

The

committee which had been elected to compose a charter of community
government wa s not given the necessary power to draft a meaningful
constitution, since the WRA had practically predetermined the functi on
of eva cuee government .

Several restriction s were placed upon the planned

charter which meant that community government would have to be subordinate
to the administration.

City government would be able to submit proposals

to the admini strat ion, thus serving as an organ of public opinion , but
in the final analysis the Project Director would determine center po licy.
One restriction imposed upon the charter was that the Issei were ineligible
f or office.

Also, before a charter could be submitted to the residents

f or ratific ation, it had to meet with the approval of the Project Director.

It was extremely difficult for the committee to propose a system

of government that would be acceptable to both the administration and
the community.
By the middle of November, 1942, the committee had devised a charter,
and it was subsequently presented to the Project Director for his approval.

Staf fo rd waited for two and a half months before he informed

the committee that conditions on the outside necessitated the postponement of evacuee gove rnment for an indefinite period of time.

Stafford

maintained that outside public opinion was opposed to such a plan.
The occurrence of demonstrations in other centers convinced him that
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the colonists were not mature enough to participate in the a££airs of
the community.l

However, it was obvious that he was loathe to relinquish

the least amount of authority into the hands of the residents.

Thus,

the administration frustrated the first attempt at self-government.
Fo r the next several months the colony was ruled by a "benevolent"
dictatorial system based on the assumption that the administration knew
what was best for the residents.2

Block Managers, appointed by the

administration, conducted the affairs of the center incident to community
living, but they were regarded as "stooges" and "WRA dogs" by the populace.?

It was difficult for a healthy relat i onship to exist between

the residents and administration as long as the former were deprived of
~11

political power.
By March of 1943, interest in self-government had revived.

Differ-

ent proposals 1'/Bre examined and discus sed by the Committee in an effort
to draft a charter that would be acceptable to the administr ation as well
as the r esidents.

By the end of May a new plan of self-government was

submitted to the Project Director, and it was subsequently approve d.
According to the charter, the governing body would consist of a sevenman Community Advisory Council.

The Council was to be popularly elected,

and its primary function was to submit recommendations to the Project
Director.
Special block meetings were held in order to explain the details
of the proposed charter to the colonists.

On June 15, 1943, re sidents

lspicer, E. H., op. cit. , p. 8.
2sakoda, James, Minidoka: An Analysis of Changing Patterns of
Social Interaction. p. 104.
3"Statistical-Functional Re port of Connnunity Government," Final
Report of Chairman of the Community Council, compiled by I. Oyama. P•

4.
'

I.
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voted, but ratification of the charter was rejected by a vote of 1,568
for, and 2,~75 against.l
of the charter .

Several reasons were advanced for the defe at

First, Minidoka had operated without a representative

body for many months, and some argued that it would be foolish to upset
the existing order.

Second, it was known that several members of the

administration disapproved of self-government: therefore, many colonists
thought that harmony could be preserved only if the charter was rejected.
Third, some residents complained that the block delegates had not satisfactorily explained the new charter.

Fourth, the charter was unveiled

to the public only four days before the e l ection, which was insufficient
time for the r esidents to study t he document.

Fifth, the majority of

the residents were apathetic toward the charter and were unconvinced that
it would improve conditions.2
It was not until November of
to write another charter.

194~,

that the delegates were able

Having met with the approval of the administra -

tion, the charter was again submitted to the public for ratification.

An

overwhelming majority of the populace voted for the document (2,657 for
and 686 against), which seemed to indicate that the community had finally
realized the desirability of having some voice, ho1-1ever feeble, in the
operat ion of the center.
The new instrument of government called for the formation of a
popularly elected council which was empowered to perform the follo1dng
duties:

lOyama, I., 01'- cit., P• 10.
2Minidoka Irrigator, January 1, 1944.

1) Submit recommendations to the Project Director.
2) Organize committees to assist the Council in its activities.

3) Determine the rules of discipline under which it would operate.
In addition the charter established an arbit r ation committee which was
to settle disagreements between colonists upon the referral of the
Council of the Project Director.

Lastly, a Judicial Commission was

cre ated, consisting of five members selected by the Community Council
with the approval of the Project Director .

This commission was to

advise the Council on matters pertaining to the preservation of l aw
and order in the community.l
The new government (the first Community Council was elected February 14, 1944)2 tried to cope with some of the prob lems that had rankled
the community since the center's inception.

During its existence evacuee

government encountered and dealt with various disorders and grievances,
a lthough the Council was unable to influence cente r policy unless it received full cooperation from the administration .

Since this was rarely

forthcoming, the venture into self-government was practically doomed
from the beginning.

H01rever, it served admirably as a liaison board

between the staff and the evacuees, and suggestions offered by the
Council 1rere sometimes seriously considered by the administration.
The Council set up committees to investigate conditions in areas
of vital concern to the people in an effort to seek ways to make life
more comfortable for t he re sidents.

In accordance

~<ith

the Constitu-

tion, the Community Co unci 1 appo inted commit tees to deal >ri th food,

!Minidoka I~rigato r , Decembe r 4, 1945. P • 1.
2

oy~,

r:;

op. cit., p. 10.

health, housing, employment, and public relations.

These committees

functioned with varying success, but at le ast they succeeded in focusing
attention upon glaring problems and injustices.
The Food Committee was a s signed to examine mess hall operations,
having received complaints that not all dishes serve d proved to be
edibl e. 1

Several Minidokans criticized the daily menu, espe cial ly since

fruits and vegetables were not ah<ays available or of the highest quality.
Mess hall equipment was found to be defective and inadequat e in many
instances.

H01<ever, due to strict rationing and difficulties in se-

curing certain foods, the Food Committee was severely restricted in
what it could accomplish.
to the
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The administration was determined to adhe r e

cent pe r day per person limitation on food.

not much was done in regard to t his grievance.2

Needless to say

Recommendations r aised

and submitted by this committee were di s re garded, but the administration
was faced with the f a ct that mess hall conditions were under attack.

A He a lth Committee was appointed to investigate he a lth conditions
in the center.

Some of the more fl agr ant health haz a r ds were r evealed

and br ought to the attention of t he administ r ation.

The cente r wat e r

supply, derived from two wells, pr oved to be cont aminated.

Relations

between the ho sp ita l staff and e va cuee helpers were revievred, since
there had been r eo ccurr i ng conflicts in this de partment .

Difficulties

involving the collection of garb age had resulted in uns i ghtly and

leyama , I., op. cit., P• 1) .
2Ibid.
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uns~~it ary

refUse, and the committee endeavored to

o~~er

recommendations

that uould eliminate this health problem. 1
The Housing Committee encountered various obstacles in trying to
satisfy numerous complaints regarding living conditions, but as the
popul ation duindled, due to the exodus

o~ ~arm

On October 4, 1944, the

the housing situation becamse manageable .
administration
one

o~

~or

additional

in~ormed

>torkers and enlistees,

the Housing Committee that the residents

o~

the blocks would have to be evicted in order to provide room

by this schene
compl aints.

o~fice
~<ere

s pace and pl ay room

~a cilities.

outraged and the Hous ing

O~ice

Japanese

a~ected

was swamped with

Realizing that evacuee relations with the administration

would be severely strained if this proposal went into

e~~ect,

the

Housing Committee advise d the administration to heed t he opposition
and refrain fiom distrubing the tranquility

o~

the community.

The

administr ation ~ollowed this suggestion and t he crisis passe d. 2
The Education Committee supposedly operated in an advisory capacity,
but the WRA s choo l administration >ras reluctant to implement its s uggestions.
nored.

Re quests for separate l at rines for school children ;rere ig-

A seve r e discipline problem with high school students caused

the committee to
recreation hall

o~fer
~or

a plan that called

teenagers.

~er

~or

the construction of a

much delay and hesitation, the

admini stration finally built a teen-age canteen in the Spring
on l :' a ~eli months be~ore the cente r closed,;

o~

1945,

This did not eliminate

t een-age van dali s1:1 , but at l east students no;r had a place to congregate.

libid . ' P• 2).
2Ibid., P• 26 .
3Ib id., P· 27.

The Education Committee also thought th at elementary school children
should have play rooms so that they could be kept

o~f

the streets .
I

This proposa l was disregarded.

The WRA school admi nistration also

turned down a suggestion that the Japanese language be taught as an
optiona l foreign language in the high schools.
The Public Relations Committee was in charge of public activities
on t he p r oject .

Memorial services for both civilians and Japanese

soldiers i n the u. S. Armed Forces were conducte d upon occasion 1nth
great so l emnity.

The demise of President Roo seve lt was mourned in a

special service. 1
Labor problems in the community were investigated by the Employment Committee, but the WRA prevented it from asserting any authority.
Hence, this body was unab le to assume any prominence and it practically
ceased to function during the l ast months of the center's existence.
The Community Council, being a . re presentative body, was naturally
expected (as ~ar a s the residents were concerned) to voice the wi ll
of the community, although this might be at vari ance with administration
policy .

The project

sta~

had little respect for community government,

being convinced that it should be used merely as a tool to implement
policy or to convert residents ove r to the admini strati on's point of
view.

When t he Council tried to express dive r gent views in regard to

a specific issue, or if it tried to remain neutral when confronted
1<ith a particular problem, t he a dministration 11ould accuse it of being
non-cooperative and obstructive. 2

lrbid., P·

;;1.

2~bid., P• 32 .

Many residents were disappointed at the limited success of evacuee
government.

The failure of self-government, to the extent that it

could be considered a failure, was a result of obstructive tactics
employed by the administration.

The Council was often presented with

problems of a contradictory nature that proved impossible to solve.
The Council was never allowed to meet conjointly with the administration so that various problems could be discussed and worked out to the
satisfaction of both (if, indeed, such a thing ~<as possible).!

Several

times Council members were subjected to undue pressure from the administration to act swiftly on a specific proposal, which, at times,
they 11ere reluctant to do, desiring more time to 11eigh and investigate
the matter in question.

Lastly, the administration expected the Council

to support the unpopular rapid relocation program, which advocated that
evacuees be pressured into leaving the center at the earliest opportunity.
This policy was severely criticized by residents, and it was dangerous
for the Council to join forces with the staff on this measure, lest it
lose whatever prestige it then possessed . 2

Because the administration

refused to allo>r the Council to function as a policy-making body,
Minidoka 1 s plt:nge into self-government turned out to be a fiasco,
and, as predicted, it never amounted to more than an advisory body
devoid of authority.
Education
The administration's attempt to introduce an effective educational
system at Minidoka fared badly.

libid., p. 55·
2Ibid.

The WRA had originally planned to
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provide t he center with proper school bui ldings; however, necessary
mate ri als we re not forthcoming, and ordina ry barracks had to be a ltered
and partitioned into makeshift classrooms.l

Mess hall t ables and un-

comfortable benches served as desks and work tables.
equipment could not be acquired easily.

Supplies and

Textbooks were scarce and

t hose that ,;ere availab le, because of their age, could not be readily
adapted for classroom use.2

A sufficient number of qualified teachers

could nat be pe rsuaded to come to Minidoka , and several evacuees had
to be r ushed t hrough a teacher-training program in order to fill the
quot a . 3
When Minidoka's t>1o elementary schools opened on October 19, 1942,
776 pu pi l s and a f aculty of ten te a chers were present.

Stafford Ele-

mentary School had t hirteen rooms and an enrollment of 447; Hunt Elementary School had nine rooms and ;;29 pupils.

Five nursery schools,

loc ated in recreation halls and staffed by eva cuees, were opened to
children not of school age.4
Hunt High School consisted of one square block of tarpaper covered
barra cks, 20 feet by 120 feet, partitioned into 32 classrooms in order
to accommodate 1200 students .

A dining hall served as an auditorium;

a l aundry room was converted into a science l aboratory, and some classes
were held in the kitchen of a mess hall,5

A Minidoka teacher

1 "Historical Narrative Report of the Community Management Di vi sian :
Educ ation Section, Minidoka Project Schools.• War Relocation Center,
Hunt, Idaho. December 15, 1945. p . 6 .
2Ibid., P• 7•
:?Minidoka Irrigator, Septembe r 29, 1942.
4Hi storical Narrative Report, op. cit., P• 7•
5Ibid. , p . 1 3·

graphica lly described the depressing conditions under which Hunt High
School opened:
When schoo l first opened at ~unidoka, in the fall of 1942
the children walked hesitantly into the tarpaper shacks
th at >rere to be their classrooms. They looked a round for
the familiar blackboard and found none, for desks, and
found only rudely constructed tables and benches uithout
backs, for books, and saw a heterogeneous collection unrelated to their needs . Moreover, they found only a few
teachers--not enough to go a r ound • • • • From one crude
building to the other they waded through s lush and mud,
which became so deep and sticky as to be a lmost imp assab le
• . . • Some days, classes had to be suspende d be cause of
the dust storms sweeping around and into the buildings •
1
Courses were for the most part selected from an educational guide
that had been prepared for the WRA by a group of Stanford University
students. 2

The curriculum emphasized classes in Americanization and

democracy.

Students could not readily abso rb lessons whi ch exto lled

the virtues of the system which had deprived them of their homes and
their freedom.

They therefore did not re spond as enthusiastically

as t hey might have done under more f avorab le circumstances.
In many respe cts the attempt to establish a progressive school
system at ltinidoka was unsuccessful.

One of the main obstacles, aside

from t he l amentable lack of supplies and trained teachers, was that
the morale of the students was not very high.

The regimented life

to which they were subjected caused them to be bitter and disillusioned.

It was difficult to create a situation whereby students

>IOuld emb r ace the opportunity to receive an education as long as they
possessed negative attitudes .

The teachers were unable to stimulate

!Glenn, Eunice, "Education Behind Barbed Wire, 11 Minidoka Irrigator ,
January 20, 1945, P• 2.
2 "Historical Narrative Report of the Community Management Division:
Educ ation Section, Minidoka Project Schools." op. cit., p. 5·
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interest under such conditions.
o~

Students were usually quite skeptical

the educational program, partly because it emphasized American

democracy, a topic which seemed to
befallen them.

magni~

the injustices that had

Adults were also critical of the school system, and

their support was not ~orthcoming.l
As

~or

highe r education, Japanese students desiring a university

education could apply for a special release, enabling them to attend
a university outside the center.

Only Nisei citizens were granted this

privilege, and they had to be financially capable
selves

~or

the school year.

o~

supporting them-

The Student Relocation division assisted

students in selecting WRA approve d universities, evaluated academic
records, and secured the admission

o~

students into institutions of

higher learning.

An adult educational program was launched in November of 1942.
It was designed to Americanize the Japanese, to give them training in
the English language, to f ami liarize them with the history
States, and to prepare them ~or relocation.2

Japanese.

the United

Classes were held in

recre ation halls or empty barr acks, and the majority
>~ere

o~

o~

the instructors

Adult education courses were open to evacuees

o~

all

ages.
An

industrial arts program for adults was inaugurated under the

direction of the state vocational education program.

Courses were

1Niver, Richard A., "Personal Narrative Report of Adult-Vocational
Education Supervisor," Minidoka Relocation Center, Hunt, Idaho. p. 4.
2 11 Historical Narrative Report of the Community Management Division:
Education Section, Minidoka Project Schools." op. cit., p . 45·

offered in farm machinery, repair and maintenance, welding, motor tune
up, poultry and dairy husbandry, truck f a rming, auto electric systems,
auto me chanics, electricity, and farm carpentry.

This program was

designed to expedite relocation by teaching students technical and
manual skills th at would aid them in obtaining employment outside the
center.l
Four libraries opened in the community during the fall of 1942 .
The school system operated three (the two elementary schools and the
high school each had a library), and a public library was established.
The project circulating library received books from various sources.
Libr aries in Wash ington, Oregon, and Idaho donated books, end residents
willingly contributed to the collection.

Over a period of months the

project libra ry acquire d 22,000 volumes, end many editions were available in Japanese. 2

The library subscribed to several newspapers end

100 different magazines for the re ading pleasure of the residents.
Cooperative Enterprise
In September of 1942 , the administration circulated a petition to
determine the attitude of the colonists regarding t he establishment
of a resident -controlled cooperative enterprise.

The purpose of the

cooperative would be to furnish residents with goods and services that
were not provided by the government.

The re action to this proposal

was favorable, and a representative body was allowed to draft a charter

1 "Historical Narrative Report of the Community Management Division:
Educa tion Section, Nini doka Project Schoo ls." op. cit., p. 45.
2 Ibid. , p. 50·
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of principles under which the organization would operate.

A Congress

of Dele gates , composed of two representatives from each block, was
elected by the residents.

The delegates selected seven from their own

number to form an organization committee which proceeded to draft articles
of incorporation .

The Congress of Delegates ratified the charter and

it was subsequently approved by the

~rRA.

The Minidoka Consumers Co-

operative became a recognized corporat i on on December 22, 1942.1
Membership in the organization was open to all adults and could
be purchased for five doll a rs.

A Board of Directors, elected by the

members of the cooperat ive, directed the affairs of the enterprise.
Goods \<e re to be sold at the current market price 1 and purchasers were
pe ri odically to receive dividends rel ative to the overall profit.

The

Minidoka Consumers Cooperative controlled a ll the businesses in the
community, since it was illegal to operate privately-owned establishments .

This evacuee-controlled organization soon set up the follo>ting

se rvice agen cies:

one shoe repair shop, one watch repair shop, two

mail order agencies, four general stores, one clothing and dry goods
store, one be auty p arlor, two barbe r shops, one flo;rer shop, one newspape r di stributing agency, a motion picture dep artment, and a dry c l eaning shop. 2

Many of these services were discontinued in July of 1943 ,

when the WRA decided to reduce the number of employed evacuees on
center proj e cts .

1Minidoka Irrigator, Se ptembe r 16 , 1944.
2I bid ., September 25, 1943.

4o
Project

Ne~<spaper

The administration began to publish a mimeographed neuspaper
called the Minidoka Irri£ator in August of 1942 .

Although it con-

tained some local news, it served primarily as a bulletin to inform the
inhabitants of recent decisions and proposals made by the lfRA and the
Project Director.

News on a national level was not covered unless it

de a lt directly with Japanese reloc ation.

The Irrigator was staffe d

by eva cuees, but in a ctuality it was controlled and censored by the
a dmini stration.

The paper announced forthcoming social and athletic

event s , and editori a ls discussed living conditions at the center and
commented on some of the problems connected with future relocation.
In l ate Febr.uary of 1943, the Consumers Cooperat ive a s sumed the
publication of the Irrigator.
in Jerome, Idaho .

From this time forward it was printed

The paper was delivered once a week to every apart-

ment in the community without charge.
Community Activities
An evacuee controlled organization, Community Activities, was

instituted for the purpose of promoting and directing recreational,
soci a l, and cultural activities.

The Community Activities division

was composed of the following six sections:

music, socials, entert ain-

ments, children 's a ctivities, a rts and crafts, and athletics.l

Each

section was manage d by an evacuee supervisor who was respons ib le for
planning and directing activities in his particul ar field.

l¥anidoka Irrigato r, Septembe r 18 , 1942.

Unfortunately,

!'
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it was dif'f'icult to provide the community

~<ith

suitable entertainment.

There were many reasons why this program could not be f'ully realized.
First, athletic equipment was practically unobtainable.

Second, only

half of' the recreation halls were available for public functions, as
the other half' were used as living quarters.

Third, it was impo ssible

to ho ld outdoor athletic events unless playing areas were cleared and
leveled.

Last, the Community Activities division operated on an ex-

tre mely limited budget.l

These obst acles had to be eliminated bef'ore

a comprehensive r ecreational program could operate successf'ully.
At f'irst t he recreation program did not receive adequate attention
because residents we re occupied with more immediate problems.

When the

chaos of settlement abated, the need for organized activities becamse
more apparent, and enthusiasm gradually incre ased.

The recreation staf'f

sponsored inexpensive events and entertainments; dances, talent shows,
record concerts, marshmallow roasts, bonfires, and athletic games became
common.

A great va riety of' experimental entertainments was planned,

as it was necessary to determine which of' these programs would best
stimulate active interest.2
Due to the exodus of' workers, lack of' facilities, and absence of'
suitable playing fields, the first attempt to promote a successf'ul
athletic program f'ailed.

Competition between men's softball leagues

was temporarily discontinued due to a shortage of players.
games could not be institued until courts were installed.

Basketball
Inf'ormal

1ileston, Bert, "Statistical- Functional Report of' Assistant Project
Director of' Community Management, Minidoka .• p. 4.
2 11 Minidoks Re port No. 8, 11 October 1942 .

p. 1.

.
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volleyball, football, and baseball games held in street i ntersections,
l<hile popular with the parti cipants, r aised clouds of dust and annoyed
l ocal re sidents .

However, the athletics division managed to organize

six gi rls' softball teams and three softball teams for older men.
Juvenile footba ll teams \<ere also formed.

The administration pr omised

that a gymnasium \<OUld eventually be constructed, but the completion
of t his pr oject \<as delayed until the spring of 1945.

Winter brought

an end to outdoor bal l games , and ice skating became popular after an
improvised rink was constructed in a vacant lot.
The Community Activities division sponsored dive r se entertainments and activities , which served to enliven an otherwise dull existence.
Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts part icipated in outdoor amusements such as
bonfires, hikes , and campfire meetings .

A movie theate r opened its

doors in Octobe r, 1942, and evening re cord concerts, with records donated
from pr ivate collections, provided entertainment fo r music lovers.
Cl asse s in arts and c r afts proved to be high ly popu l ar with residents.
Novel a rtistic cre ations , including sagebrush furniture, paintings,
J apanese do lls, and mini ature gardens, were enthusiastically exhibited.
Christmas was always a speci a l occasion at
with app ropriate fanfare and festivity .

V~i doka ,

celebrated

The WRA thoughtfully provided

the cente r wit h Christmas trees, which we re pl aced in dining halls,
school rooms , and hospital wards.
for t he Mini doka children.

Church organizations donate d presents

Each block contri buted to a Christmas fund

that was use d to purchase candies and decorations.
Re ligi on
Several religious organizations we r e represented at Minidoka,
including the Cat ho lic Church, six Protestant denominations, and three

Buddhist sects.

Services were held in barracks especially equipped

with pianos, seating accommodations, and occasionally an organ.

The

pianos and organs were donated by Protestant and Buddhist churches in
Seattle and Portland. 1
The six Protestant denominations combined their respective memberships to form the Federated Christian Church.

Eight evacuee minis-

ters and a number of Caucasion missionaries from neighboring towns
presided over Sunday school, prayer meetings, and other religious
gathe rings .
Seattle. 2

~tinidoka

Catholics were formerly members of a parish in

After the ordeal of evacuation, they attempted to preserve

the social and religious connections and activities that the congregation had previously enjoyed.
~linisters

of three Buddhist sects formed the United Buddhist

Church by consolidating their respective congregations .
gradual ly deteriorated,

and denominational services were

ho~<ever,

eventually conducted separately.)
a weekly newspaper, Buddhism in
English and Japanese.

This union

The 2,000 ~nidoka Buddhists received

~nidoka,

which was published in both

Aside from the regular Sunday services, the

Buddhist sects sponsored adolescent and adult devotional meetings.
The plan to establish local institutions and services met with
only partial success.

In many r espects this scheme was intended to

give the community a facade of respectability, but economic, social

l ~unidoka Irrigator, November 18, 1942 . p. ) .

2Ibid., Sep tember 25, 194). P• 5·
)"WRA Community Activities Section. •
Johnson.

Compiled by J. \1es ley

and political institutions, nominally controlled by the residents,
~ailed

to hide the

~act

that Minidoka resembled a concentration camp

more than it did a progressive community.

The evacuees were aware

o~

this and consequently they did not respond with as much enthusiasm as
would have been the case under more encouraging circumstances.

CHAPTER IV

PROJECT ADMINISTRATION
The pur pose of the center uaa to provide evacuees with basic
necessities at a minimum amount of cost and to relocate colonists as
soon a s conditions would permit) A Project Director, assisted by a
staff of Cauc a sian personnel that had been recruited from Idaho and
adj acent states, managed the affairs of the community.

The administra-

tion did not have much l atitude in initiating policy, since center
procedure was determined at the WRA ')ffi ce in Washington and t r ansmitted
to the local proje ct administration. 2

Center management was unable

to a lt er the amount of available goods or appr eciab ly improve living
condit ions at Minidoka because of the strict rationing policy regulated
by the liRA.

However, the Pro ject Director could to a .limited extent

fix the degree of evacuee participation in center affai rs, and he was
a lso in a posit ion to influence relat ions between management and colonists.

The attitude of the administration and the way in which it

managed the center intimately affect ed t he J apanese, who were quick to
r espond unfavor ab ly i f harsh t actic s or un1-1arranted measure s we re employed.

linformation f or t his chapter was derive d f rom the following
sources: Sakoda, James, Minidoka : An Analysis of Changing Pat te rns of
Socia l Int erac tion, unpublished Ph.D. di ssertation, Uni ver sity of
California, 1955; Stafford, Harry L. , "Project Directo r 1 s Narrative, •
Minidoka Re l ocation Center , Hunt, Id aho; "statistical-FUnctional Report
of Per sonne l Management Section, 11 Final Report of Pe rsonnel Section.
Compiled by L. W. Folsom.
2s akoda, J ame s, 11 An Analysis of Changing Patterns of Social
Int e r action," tmpublished Ph .D. dissertation, Dept. of Sociology,
Unive rsity of California. p . 101.
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Personnel Problems
The problem of finding competent trained personnel for Minidoka
proved to be a lmo st insurmountable.

~anidoka

suffe r ed from a high

employee turnover rate, making it exceedingly difficult to secure staff
membe r s wl10 we re educationally and psycho logica lly prep ared for the
unique conditions of relocation.

Not only were emp loyees disheartene d

by some of the unplea sant aspect s of center life, but t h ere were other
le ss obvious f actors which we r e responsib le f or the loss of administ r a tors.

Some st aff members left l.Unidoka because of an inabi lity to

cooperate wit h thei r superiors .!

The hierarchical system was conducive

to fricti on because of the s upr eme power of the Project Direct or over
po li cy .

Living qu a r ters provided for t he pe r sonne l pr oved to be in-

adequate and a source of discontent, forcing many employees to live
in ne a r by t o1ms .

Oth er staff members had t o be rele a sed tmen it became

apparent that they

>~ere

incapable of handl ing the particular posi tion

to >lh ich they were a ssigned. 2
Personnel Attitudes
Cooper ation between staff members, a situation t hat
site to the smooth functioning of t he cent er,

~<a s

~<as

prerequi-

difficult to a chieve,

mainly be cause they possessed diverse ide a s as to how the administration should deal with t he eva cuees and conduct t he affairs of the
center .

It is poss i bl e to cl assify administrators a ccording to their

l •st atisti cal-Functiona l Re port of Pe r sonne l Management Section , •
Final Report of Pe rsonne l Section , Comp iled by L. W. Fulsom.
2Ibid!.
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relative tolerance toward Japanese.
def'ini tely anti-Japanese .

One group could be considered

'I"he prevailing philosophy of' this faction

was that colonists should receive severe treatment because of' their
"obvious" ties with Japan.

Appointed personnel holding this view

usually had a stereotyped impression of' the Japanese as craf'ty, treacherous people, who could be controlled only through the exercise of' stern
discipline. 1

Another group proved to be very sympathetic toward the

colonists, beliving that they should be given a f'air chance to prove
their loyalty.
colonists.

A third group had less definite opinions regarding the

Personne l of' this category did not always trust the Issei,

but the Nisei were considered to be respectable and trustworthy citizens. 2
Natura lly, as long as this situation existed it was extremely dif'f'icult f'or staf'f' members to reach agreement as to what center policy
should be in regard to the J apanese .

The result was that similar prob-

lems sometimes evoked diverse reactions f'rom the staf'f' members.

Antag-

onism between sensitive colonists and into l erant personnel deve loped
as a result of' this condition.

Also, friction among administrative

employees often could be traced to an inability to reach agreement over
the status of' evacuees.
Matters were made worse by the f'act that the intolerant group was
constantly grm<ing.

l>cie to a shortage of' trained personnel, positions

were fill ed by peop le who were totally unfamiliar ;lith problems connected with relocation, having formed their opinion of' J apanese-Americans
through rumors, gossip, and biased articles appearing in Hearst Ne1;spapers.

111 Stati stical-F'unctiona l Report of Community Analysis Section, •
Historical Sketch of Analysis Section, compiled by Elmer Smith.

2 Ibid.
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Such administrato rs could not always be expected to act with discretion
in their relationships 1fith evacuees.

1

Another reason why so many

administ r ators >tere anti-Japanese >ras that they had little or no contact
1-lith the colonists.

Fraternization with evacuees >ms discouraged.

The

standard policy of' the administration lias that f'riendly or personal
assoc i ations 1dth the Japanese should be avoided; a ll contact was to
be on a purely business level.2

Under these circumstances it was e asy

f'or the a dministration to ignore the pul se of' the community.
staff' members who f'elt compassion f'or the Japanese tlere not in
a position to inf'luence center policy toward their views.

The tel-

erant group was composed of' church of'f'icials, some school teacher s,
mi ssionarie s, and a f'ew social workers.)

Although this element could

be easily ignored by the administratioh, it, nevertheless, served in
some instances as a liberal check on _c!enter management .
Attitude of' the Administr ation
The basic policy of' the administration >las to ret ain control of'
center gove rnment and to discourage evacuee participation in center
af'f'airs.4

Center management was reluctant to relinquish authority

to a popularly elected community council, pref'erring to operate through
Japanese leaders who were directly responsible to the administration.
Evacuee managers, appointed by the Project Director, acted as block

1

"statisti cal-Functiona l Report of' Connnunity Analysis," op.cit . , p . l2

2 Ibid.
)Ibid., p. 6.
4sakoda, op . cit., p. 105.

re presentatives and performed various duties incident to barracks
l iving .
>~ere

Because they

>~ere

not popularly elected, some block managers

distrusted and even despised by evacuees, and at times accused

of siding

>~ith

the administ ration against the interests of t he com-

munity.1
Although center management presumably
mitted by t he WRA, it
conditions.
>~oul d

>~as

follo>~ed

instructions trans-

necessary to adj ust policy according to local

Discretion was necessary in this procedure, since evacuees

cooperate only to the extent that they were satisfied >lith the

operation of the center.

The absolute nature of t he system, which made

colonists entire ly dependent upon management for food, employment,
hous ing, education , etc., lent it se lf to evacuee attack.

An explosive

situation 1·rould rapid ly develop if the administration tried to enforce
unpopular decisions.

During the early months of Minidoka's history,

res i dents seemed to possess a discernible amount of respect for center
management, and, asi de from the fence incident, there >rere no riots or
demonstrations which would indicate severe hostility .

This situation

changed when the administration applied pressure tactics to expedite
the relocation process in preparation for final liquidation, a topic
which >rill be discussed in a l ater chapter.
The WRA cannot be blamed for its failure to provide the center
with men who were prepared for the unique conditions of center life.
Qua lified personnel could not be easily found to fill vacant positions
since men of high ca liber were needed in more vital areas.

But it is

unfortunate that St afford did not curb the actions of t he more militant
anti-Japanese administrators, thus avoiding some of the disturbances
that took place.
lSakoda, op. cit., p. 105

CHAPTER V
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
Soon after the center's inception, the project administration
l aunched a drive to f'ind jobs f'or willing evacuee workers .l An employment of'f'ice was set up to recruit a labor f'orce f'or work both inside
and outside the relocation center.

Center management hired hundreds

of' colonists to perf'o rm necessary services in the community.

Evacuees

were also encouraged to help harvest crops on private f'arms in the locality .

The Japanese gratef'ully accepted this opportunity to escape

the routine of' camp lif'e and worked as truck drivers, dining hall
helpers, mechanics, maintenance men, and laborers.

An unskilled or

semi-skilled worker received #16.00 a month, while some prof'essionally
traine d J apanese were paid $19.00 a month. 2

A f'ire department and

police department were operated by evacuees, and the hospital hired
Japanese nurses and aids to wait on the patients .

Wages were poor and

many of' the tasks were disagreeable, but gainf'ul employment of'f'ered
diversion f'rom an otherwise humdrum existence.
A labor board was organized to handle the grievances of' the workers.

The need f'or such a board becarre manif'est when the Placement

linf'ormation f'or this chapter was derived f'rom the f'ollowing
sources: ~~nidoka Irrigator; "Final Report of' t he Agriculture Section,"
Minidoka Reloc ation Center, compiled by Louis E. Rice and Rhuel D.
Beebout; "WRA Community Analysis Section: A Preliminary Survey of'
the Boilermen's Dispute at Minidoka , " Minidoka Relocation Center, March:;;,

1944.

2Minidoka Irrigator, September 4, 194;5
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Office \<as flooded with complaints from employees who
fied with working rules and working conditions .
Practice Board

>~as

>~ere

dissatis-

The Fair Labor

staffed with popu larly-elected J apanese.
Off-Center Employment

The WRA made arrangements whereby evacuees could leave the center
and wor k as farm l ab orers in Idaho and nearby states.

Le ave permits

l<e re gr ante d under the follmiing qualifications:
l) The applicant's loyalty to the United States had t o be
established.
2)

He had to be a citizen of the United states.

3)

He could work only in states outside the Western Defense

Command.

4) Evacuees coyld not work in communities where anti-Japanese
sentiment prevailed.
The pr esence of Japanese in many towns and cities in Idaho was
looked upon with horr or by some citizens, while certain conservative
organizations (motivated by economic considerations as 1rell as possessing a basic suspicion of the Japanese ) deeply resented the intrusion
of "aliens" into civilian American society .

Many vrere convinced that

evacuees should remain in relocation centers for the remainder of the
war, where they coul d be kept under strict observation.

The off-center

employment policy was unp opular with some groups be cause it enabled
J apanese to compete in the l a bor market .

Resolutions, passed by vari-

ous anti-J apanese organ izations in Idaho, expressed concern over the
infilt r ation of e vacuee workers, demanding that they be restricted in

l ynnidoka Irri gat or, Oct ober 28 , 1942 .
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their activities or confined to the center for the duration of the
\'IB.r.

The Idaho Department of the Veterans of Foreign Wars denounced
the off-center employment policy in a resolution that is typical of
statements made by detractors of the program:
We hereby voice our disapproval of the entire policy being
followed by our federal, state, and local government toward
the Japanese >rhich our military authorities felt were a
menace to our national security when they evacuated them
from the Pacific Coast and are still so distrustful of
these J apanese that they do not desire them in the military forces yet the federal, state, and local governments
accord them the privileges of entering into competition
with American labor and business while American youths
are taken from their places of business and labor to fight
the horde of emperor worshipping maniacs from the Island
of Japan.l
The Pocatello Central Labor Union expressed disapproval of the
employment of Japanese by local business establishments in a resolution which advo cated a boycott of stores following this practice:
Whereas, these Japanese are a detriment to the American
standard of' living • • • are not inducted into the armed
forces • • • are being employed in business houses in
Pocatello and in the state of Idaho, in jobs vacated by
our workers • • • we request all members organized l a bor
to refrain from patroniz~g aQy and all business establishments employing Japs .
There were other manifestations of anti-Japanese sentiment in
Idaho.

The Twin Falls Kiwanis Club held that Japanese residing in

the city should be forbidden to speak their "alien language,• claiming
that

11

the spoken foreign words of our enemies grate upon our senses, 11

l!unidoka Irrigator, June 24 , 1944.
2Minidoka Irrigator, October 2, 1943.
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and that this practice provoked "suspicion and distrust ."l

The Twin

Falls chapt e r of the Veterans of Foreign Wars suggested that JapaneseAmericans be treated as prisoners of war and held in concentration
camps until they could be shipped to Japan. 2

The Idaho Grange recom-

me nded that legislation be passed which would prevent Japanese from
buying land. :?

An American Legion official in Boise complained that

Jap anese were ~rendering about the city "with out apparent supervision. • 4
Such extreme views were not re presentative of the opinion of the
majority of Idaho's inhabitants, but they serve to show that antiJapanese att itudes were held by a vociferous minority.
Loc al farmers were at first reluct ant to hire Japanese l abor.
Many sincerely believed that the "enemy a liens" would not prove to
be trustworthy or reliable employees.

Skepticism, hm-rever, soon disap-

peared ><hen reports circulated that Japanese harvesters were willing
and industrious worke rs.
Because of the extensive labor shortage in the RoolcyMountain
region, local farmers hired Hunt evacuees to work in the potato fields,
and l arge sugar beet corporations sent agents to Minidoka in an effort
to recruit Japanese workers.

By October of 194:;, 24oO Japanese from

Minidoka were toiling in the fields of Idaho, northern Utah, eastern
Oregon, eastern Waahington, and Montana.5

l runidoka Irrigator, June 5, 194:;.
2Ibid., October 25, 1945·
:?Ibid., J anuary 1, 1944.

4Tw~ .Fa ils Times, June 28, 194:; .
5Minid~ka Irrigator, October 28, 1942 .

Although wages and working conditions were guaranteed by contracts,
many Japanese

~ound o~~-p ro ject ~arm

emp loyment to be most unpleasant.

Not only was the work tedious, but living accommodations provided by
employers

~requently

proved to be inadequate.

The following quotation

describes the reaction of a Japanese woman from Minidoka who was emplayed in the Idaho potato

~ields:

The human body can stand only so much, and only so much,
and no more. The spud-pickers • • • • are tottering on
the brink of life and death after each day's work. In the
first two days, we out in Stirling, Idaho, have learned
deep appreciation of the so-called lowly potatoes • • • •
Propagandists have injected into our willing ears the
jui cy morsel that spud picking, while being a mite hard,
was easy • • • • Thirty sacks later, with backs splitting,
and breath coming in convulsive, tortured gasps, we
looked up with glazed eyes • • • • We never fail to
marvel at how much the hyman body can stand, because
somehow we existed • • •
Because the Japanese were not used to such strenuous labor, it
was inevitable that some would complain.

However, most eventually

be came inured to the working conditions, and one farmer was able to
report that "they were the finest, most cooperative help that we have
had in a number of years.

The crew was always on time in the morning,

worked as long as possible, regardless

o~

weather conditions

.2

The program of off-center employment was successful for two reasons:
Japanese workers helped to save vital crops, and the local populace
be came more tolerant, having had personal contact with evacuees.
The employment situation at lolinidoka was adversely affected by
the exodus of farm workers, causing a severe shortage of manpower.

lMinidoka Irri gator, October
2Ibid ., January

;o, 1943.

30, 1945.
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In order to compensate for this constant drain on labor, the administration decided to train women for occupations previously open only
to men.
firemen.

Evacuee women were hired as service station operators and
The placement

o~ice

proudly announced that "in a short

whi le , we will have women carpenters, truck drivers, mechanics, swampere, and farm equipment operators.•l

Women apprentices received only

$12 . 00 a month.
New Employment Policy
Unt il July of 1943 center management had tried to employ as many
residents as possible, and as a result Minidoka had the smallest Oaucasian staff of

a~

relocation center.

The administration had adopted

a rule that no Caucasion should hold a position that could be filled
by an eva cuee.

Featherbedding existed on many projects, and while

this policy was pursued, on-center employment exceeded 4,5QO.
In July of 194), the WRA Director, Dillon S. Myer, ordered all
relocation centers to reduce drastically the number of colonists on
the center payrolls.

This change in po licy was designed to encourage

relocation as well as decrease the operational cost of the centers. 2
Although the \iRA allowed local project administrations a period of
three months to eliminate jobs, tho employment

o~ice

at Minidoka

immediately r educ ed the l abo r force to the pres cribed level.

In just

two weeks the labor force suffe red a decrease of approximately 1,200
men.

Dep artments considered expendable were whittled down to a skeleton

.lMi~idok~ I;rigato r , October 10, 1942.
2Ibid., Juiy 10, 194).

crew.

The CommurJity Activities' staff was pr a ctically eliminated,

and t he Consumers Cooperative wa s forced to dis continue many services.
The fi sh market, drygoods store, flowersho p , and movie the ater were
clo sed down a s a result of this new policy . 1
Natur a lly, the >;orkers affected by this drastic decision were
outraged .

The y could not underst an d why the administration was so

anxious to deplete the labor force tthen the \1RA had allowed three
months fo r the policy to go into eff ect .

The following diagram indi-

cates the extent of t he emp loyment cut:

Table 3.

Effe ct of Employment Reduction Poli cy on Various Dep a rtments.a
Employees
June l

Emp l oyees
July 15

Hospit al
Interna l Security
Steuard
Transportation
Fiscal
Administrative
Busine ss Enterprise
Property Control
Agri culture
Fire Dep a rtme nt
Employment •
Procurement
St atistics
Project Attorney
Evacuee Property
Public Works
Conmnmity Services

527
105
1,500
241
6
46
212
74
152
50
72
10
24
8
8
825
582

260

Total

4,117

Depa rtment

aMinidoka Ir r i gator, July 10, 194;;.

lMinidoka Irri gator, July 10, 194;;.

50

1,1 20
170
6
46
150

52

200

5S
50

8
14
6
6

505
177
2,874
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The de cision to limit employment helped to undermine the friendly
rel at i onshi p that had previously existed between the administration
end the r es idents, causing serious difficulties in the future.

It

wus believed by most people that the administration had immediately
curtailed employment in order to cre at hardships, so that colonists
would >rent to relocate as soon a s possible . 1

Resentment towards this

policy culminated in a display of resistance on the part of maintenance
men 1·rho, backed by the populace, were able to successfully oppose the
administ ration.

Boilermen 1 s Strike
As a r esult of the decision to eliminate all jobs not essential
to the operation of the center, the number of maintenance l<orkers for
each block was r educed from eleven to four.

In November o:f 1945, the

administration tried to :force this department to increase its working
schedule to 24 hours.

The maintenance >rorkers were a+ready burdened

vrith duties, and they refused to accept the proposed change .

In De-

cember, the Assistant Project Director ordered the maintenance department to adhere to the new schedule, although it was :fairly obvious that
this decision \iould meet resistance.

The maintenance workers, not

intimidated by this ultimatum, immedi ate ly handed in their resignations . 2
As long as the strike was in effect, the boilers ...ere unattended
and the co l ony \ias without hot water; consequent ly, the 1·rhole conmunity

'"WRA Community Analysis Section, A Preliminary Survey of the
Boilermen 1 s Dispute at Minidoka,• Project Ana lysis Series No. 15,
March 5 , 1944.
2Ibid., P• 2

58
became concerned about the dispute .
discuss the situation.

Several meetings were held to

The maintenance workers explained and defended

their position, holding that they should not be expected to perform
extra work unless they had extra help.
about not having hot

~<ater,

The residents

~<ere

unhappy

but they supported the maintenance men

on this issue.

It became apparent that the dispute was not limited to this one
department, but, in actuality, everyone in the center
the a ction of the administration.

~<as

affected by

The central question >ms whether or

not center management could arbitrarily force its
lace, regardless of the feelings of the latter.

~<ill

upon the

On January 6,

popu~

1944,

a delegation of women, representing a ll the blocks, marched on the
Acting Project Director's office and demanded that the matter be settled and that the rights of the maintenance men be respected.

The

Community Council examined the problem and exerted further pressure
upon the administ r ation to >nthdraw the proposed 24-hour working schedule.
The administration found it very difficult to fight public sentiment.

On January 10, the Project Director retreated from his previous

position and informed the maintenance men that he would retra ct the
24-hour schedule if they would return to ~<ork. 1

They accepted this

proposa l and r esumed work, but this solution failed to sooth the illfeelings that had been aroused.
major conflict

bet>~een

The boilermen's strike was the first

the administration and the re sidents .

damage wrought could not be easily repaired . 2
li bid., P• 6.
2 Ibid., P• 12.

The
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The relatively peaceful termination of the dispute was considered
a definite victory for the Community Council because of the role it
played in the settlement.

With its prestige thus bolstered, the Council

became a discernible force in the community, but it was still locked
in the role of an advisory body.
Agriculture
An agricultural problem was inaugurated at Minidoka during the

Spring of

1945 that was designed to transform the colony into a self-

sustaining unit.

Before this goal could be realized the agricultural

department had to overcome serious obstacles.

Since southern Idaho

h as a cold climate the growing season is rel atively short.

Scanty

precipitation made extensive irrigation necessary, but the hilly terrain often made it difficult to water the crops sufficiently.

NUmer-

ous lava outcroppings broke up fields into relatively small units, thus
limiting the acreage of land that could be brought under cultivation.
A l ack of proper farming equipment forced t he colonists to do most of
t he clea ring and planting by hand.

Lastly, most Japanese field hands

knew little about irrigation and agriculture so that the most efficient
methods were not always employed.

These factors warred against the

possibility that the Minidoka farm would ever become a successful
enterprise.!
Evacuees experienced great difficulty in clearing the land, since
suitable f arming equipment was unobtainable.

At first field hands

l•Final ~port of the Agriculture Section, • Minidoka Reloc ation
Center • . Compiled by Louis E. Rice and Rhuel D. Beebout.
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tried to cut sagebrush 1·1ith hand tools, but this method prove d to be
slou and laborious.

Eighty acres were cle ared by hand.

Sagebrush

Later on in the fall of 1943,

Has collected into piles and burned.

a more efficient method was employed to subjugate the land.

A rail-

road r ail Has dragged a long the ground, >lhich uprooted the sagebrush
most effective ly.l
Approximately 250 acr3s were cleared, irrigated, and placed under
cultivation during the spring of 1943·

A 1·1ide variety of crops were

planted, including corn, lettuce, peas, celery, onions, carrots,
potatoes, broccoli, cabbage, cantaloupe, honeydew melons, pumpkins ,
turnips, zucchini, squash, string beans, and many other vegetables.
The diversity of vegetables and amounts gr01ro were determined by the
agricultural products that were needed by the center, the type of crops
that could be suc cessfully grown in the area, and the manpower and
agricultura l equi pment that was avail ab le.

It >ms also necessary for

crops to be suitable for storage or shipping, and, >rhen possible, the
colonist 1 s t astes uere taken into considerati on. 2
Evacuees harvested more than 2,221,000 pounds of crops in 1943, 3
Insects and improper irrigational methods ruine d some of the vegetables,
but enough pot atoes >rere gro>m to last the colony for a year.
crops ;rere disposed of in different

>~ays.

Surplus

A canning and pickling plant

preserved veget ables that could not be immediately consumod, and pot atoes were stored in a l ar ge root cellar.

l "Final Report of the Agriculture Section, " Minidoka Re l ocation
Center . Compiled by Louis E. Rice and Rhuel D. Beebout. p . 5·
2 Ibid., P• 45

~nidoka Irrigator, Septembe r 16, 1944 .
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The 1944 harvest, 5,817,511 pounds, was disappointing, although
more than 800 acres had been brought under cultivation.!
for this poor yield were manifold.

The reasons

It was due partially to a great

turnover in l abor resulting from the seasonal leave program.

The

Agricultural Department found it necessary to recruit high school
students, children, and elderly adults (including women) to plant,
irrigate, and harvest the crops.

The vast majority of this motley

crew was inexperienced, and their efforts, though commendable, did
not always produce favorable results.

Not only were they incapable

of operating the farm equipment, but they did not always follow sage
advice on how to increase crop productivity. 2

Another factor wa s

that much of the land remained unirrigated because of the unevenness
of the terr ain .

In spite of these difficulties, by the end of 1944,

large quantities of cabbage, carrots, potatoes, and onions had been
stored in root cellars.

These surplus crops were exchanged for foods

(especially beef and milk) produced at other relocation centers.
In addition to the agricultural program other attempts were made
to help place the

econo~

on a self-sufficient basis.

A hog ranch and

a poultry unit were established as part of the lo!inidoka farm.

The

poultry farm had 8,600 chickens by the end of 1945, and 5,500 laying
hens produced three cases of eggs per day.

The hog ranch contained

more than 4oo hogs by December of 1945, furnishing the dining halls
with 25 head per week.

In 1944, the poultry farm produced )8,682

lMinidoka Irrigator, January 20, 1945.
2 11 Final Report of the Agricultural Section," op. cit., P• 67 .
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pounds of poultry and 62,730 e ggs , and the hog farm produced 306,921
pounds of pork. 1
The Agriculture Department was in ope r ation from the f all of 1942
unti l the fall of 1944.

During t hi s peri od, 6,026,450 pounds of

vegetables and grains for livestock .rere produced, valued at $170,002. 2
The agricultura l program may not have been a model of efficiency, but
it gave residents needed employment and enabled Minidoka to contribute
her small share in the war effort.

From June, 1943, until May, 1945,

when t he l ast of the stored foodstuffs disappeared, tho farm furnished
Minidoka with approximately one-sixth of the center's food requirement. 3
Considering the many obst acles with which the Agricultural Department
h ad to contend, it is amazing that the program produced as much as
it did.
Food Preservation
Since l arge quantities of fresh vegetables produced on the Minidoka
farm could not be readily consUJIJOd in center mess halls, it be ca. me
apparent that the construction of s. food preservation plant would
prevent spoilage and provide the center with canned and pickled vegetables during the winter months.

The food preservation program,

l aunched in September of 1943, was determined by the tastes of the
colonists as well as t he equipment that was available for such an
operation.

A canning and pickling plant was improvised from materials

found on the center.

Vats, tables, and hot and cold water linea installed

in an empty barra ck constituted the canning plant, while surplus barrels
!Minidoka Irrigator, January 20, 1945·
2•Fina l Report of the Agricultur al Section ," op.cit. , p . 1;55 .
3Ibid.

served as pi ckling containers.

However, the make-shift canning ma-

chinery proved to be unsatisfactory, as attempts to can vegetables
re sulted in failure.

Plans we re made to acquire proper cannery equip-

ment, but none wa s availab le, the canning operation was discontinued. 1
While t he pickling plant was in operation, surplus vegetables
were stored in cellars and pickled during winter months.

This pro-

gram was more successful than the canning venture, and the residents
enjoyed pickled foods for most of the year.

In 1944, center management

temporarily closed the pickling pl ant, having discovered that some
imaginative evacuees were using equipment for the manufacture of sake,
an intoxicating beverage made from fermented rice.

The pickling plant

was permanently closed December 31, 1944, when the suppl y of vegetables
became exhausted.
The economic activities of the center were inefficiently operated
in many cases, f ailing to fulfill the intended purpose of making Minidoka a self-sufficient enterprise.

However, employment served to keep

willing workers busy and helped give Minidoka the semblance of a normal
community.

Many J apanese took pride in their work and accepted the

challenge of building an economic base with enthusiasm.
pecially true of the agriculture department.

This was es-

Minidokans were proud

of the f act that the farm program was successful to the extent that the
center had fresh vegetables during the summer months .

l"Fina l Report of Agricultural Division,• op. cit., p. 121-12).

CHAPTER VI
INDUCTION AND SEGREGATION

Following t he attack on Pearl Harbor, the War Department adopted
a po licy whereby Japanese-Americans were refused admission into the
Armed Forces.

However, in January of 194:;; , the War Department, revers-

ing its previous position, announced that a special Japanese combat
unit, composed of loyal Nisei, would be formed as soon a s volunteers
could be encouraged to enlist.

If the Japanese accepted this plan

with enthusiasm, the Army would con sider drafting all eligible Nisei
in the future .1
Reaction to Enlistment Program
Minidokans re acted to this announcement with mixed feelings.
Main support for the program came from the young Nisei, since enlistment offered them a chance to leave the center as well a s an opportunity to help in the war effort.

The Isse i element (as well as

many Nisei) was skeptical of this plan for various reasons.2

First,

the segregation idea behind the scheme was unacceptable to many.
Second, it did not appear re asonabl e for the government to expect
Japanese-Americans to defend the country when they had consistently
been deprived of their rights as citizens.

Third, alien parents were

iMinidoka Report No. 57, "WRA Registration and Arlliif Volunteering,"
Minidoka Relocation Center, Hunt, Idaho. p. :;; .
2Ibid .

afra id of thb future if their sons were killed in battle.l

Fourth,

some were afraid that the Japanese battalion would be purposely sacrificed at the front lines.
Drive for Support
The administration was aware that these fears would have to be
dispelled before the enlistment program could be successful.

In an

attempt to rally t he support of the le aders of the community, the
Pr o je ct Director invited several Issei spokesmen to a conference, so
th at s ome of the troublesome problems f acing the volunteering program
could be discussed.

The aforementioned criticisms were raised, but,

after a gre at de al of debate, the le aders decided to support the plan .
It wa s hoped that Nisei soldiers would prove by their courage and
loyalty that t he great majority of Japanese-Americans were patriotic
citizens.

Also , the creation of an all-Japanese combat team could

h a sten the dis solution of the centers, since the public would become
more tolerant when it was learned that J apanese-Americans were dying
for t he ir country. 2

An advisory group of Japanese leaders was formed to counsel the
admini stration on how the latter should approach the community on the
subject of voluntary induction .

It was decided that a series of meet-

ings he ld in differ ent sections of the community would enable the
a dmini stration to expla in the details of the program and allow the

!Aliens had a con sidera ble amount of property held in their sons'
name s , and t hey were a fr aid that they would be unable to inherit it,
due to the f act t hat l aws in Oregon and Wa shington prevented Isse i from
inher i ting land.
2
1unidoka Report No.

57 ,

op. cit., P•

7•
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evacuees to discuss the proposcl.

At t hese meetings the adcinistrn-

tion made it clear that regardless of the past it was necessary for
the Nisei to seize this opportunity and prove to Americans that Japanese
citizens were willing to sacrifice their lives for their country.
meetings were well attended and proved to be quite successful.

The

The

attitude of the community gradual ly shifted to favor the voluntary
induction program. l
A group from the War Department arrived at Minidoka in early
February to accept applications from eligible Nisei evacuees.

The

Army te am met \'lith some opposition \mile the enlistment campaign
being promoted .

\ffl.S

It was obvious that many evacuees were still resentful

toward the government because of relocation.2

Some were not convinced

that the War Department had actually changed its basic attitude regarding J apanese soldie r s.

Many Japane se servicemen having volunteered

for t he Armf before Pearl Harbor, had subsequently been discharged
without due cause .

Also, the military po lic stationed at the center

took precaution to man the guard towers while the enlistment program
was being undertaken.

Such preparations made it appear as though the

government ' s r eversal of po licy in regard to Japanese servicemen was
in actuality a gross example of hypocrisy.
Volunt ary Enlistment
Beginning February 10, a ll male citizens over sixteen years of
age were registered and interviewed by the Army team.

lMinidoka Report No . 57., op. cit., P• 8 .
2Ibid .

The Administration
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held period ic meetings with potential volunteers, explaining the details
o~

the program and urging them to join .

beginning

o~

the program, but it gradually incre ased until by April

more than 300 had app lied
o~

induction, which represented 19 percent

~lag

~ir st

o~

17 and )8 .

cl assi~ied

as a ccept ab le

~or

mi lit ary service.

dedication ceremony was held in honor

contingent

o~

o~

289

o~

On April 30,

the departure

o~

the

volunteers, numbering ;51 , that 11as scheduled to

l eave for Fort Douglas, Utah, on May 1.
ceremony.

A total

volunteers were given physical examinations , and 211 were

eventually
a

~or

al l eligib le mal es between the ages

~unidoka

Volunteering was light at the

A l ar ge crowd witnessed this

The en li stees marched in a parade accompanied by the Boy

Scout drum and bugle corps .
coat s l eeves .

Volunteers wore blue "V" insignias on their

Each dining hall in the center displayed

~l ags

upon

>rhich we re stars designating t he number o~ vo l unteers in the block,l
The drive ended \<ith

~nidoka

le ading the other relocation centers

in the numbe r o~ voluntary enlistments.2

In October o~ 194;5 , an Honor

Board was pl aced next to t he main gate >rhich listed the names

o~ ~i 

dokans serving in the U.S. Ar11IIf.
Con s cription
Due to the success
ment, in J anuary

o~

o~

the volunteer a r11IIf program, the War Depart-

1944, announced that in the futur e male Ni se i would

be dra~e d into t he Army . )

As a result o~ the inauguration o~ t he

l~nidoka I r rigat or , May

2Ibid ., March 20 , 194;;.
;;Ibi d., J anuary 29 ,

1944.

1, 194;;.
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draft, the number of llinidokans in the Arii11f greatly increased.

By

the end of 1944, more than 800 re sidents were serving in the Armed
Forces.l

The draft program did not receive the unanimous support of

the colonists.

Opposition did not interfere with the program, but

by October of 1944, )4 Hunt boys had been convicted for draft evasion. 2
This

ho•~ver,

that

~re

represented but a small percentage of the total number

eventually drafted.

A large number of Hunt servic< men experienced combat, and many
were killed in action.

Memorial services

v~re

periodically held in

honor of }unidoka soldiers who died in the defense of their country.
Segregation
Ever since the inception of the relocation program, _a_ small minority of eva cuees, classified as disloyal, had intermittently opposed
the WRA and proved to be a potential source of agitation.

This nega-

tive element exerted a malign influence in each community.

As long

as these malcontents

>~ere

all o >~ed

to associate with loyal colonists,

they would be, in the eyes of the WRA, in a position to undermine the
peace of the community.

As a result of this situation, Dillon Myer,

Director of the WRA, announced that al l disloyal Japanese living in
relocation centers would be transferred to the Tule Lake Relocation
Center in Northern California.3

This group included those who had

1Minidoka Irrigator , December 28, 1944.
2Ibid ., October 7, 1944.
3Ibid., July 17, 1943.

applied for repatriation. 1

Loyal J apanese who we re presently living

at Tule Lake were to be dispersed to other relocation centers.

As

a result of this new segregation policy, Minidoka sent 272 of her inhabitants to Tule Lake and received over 1,500 Tuleans in return.

The

first contingent from Tule Lake, numbering 523, arrived by train on
September 25, 1943; t.ro other groups (numbering approximately 500 each)
arrived within the next few days.2

The ~linidoka segregants departed

for Tule Lake on September 25.
Minidoka experienced gre at difficulty in accommodating this large
influx of colonists.

The newcomers consisted of 380 family units, but

only 260 apartments were availab le.

This shortage of living quarters

meant that in many instances two families had to share one apartment.
Recreation halls we re partitioned to serve as temporary dwellings.
These crowded conditions h ad to be tolerated until workers left the
center on seasonal or indefinite leave.
Segregation and Registration
Se gre gation and registration disrupted the routine of the community.
The induction of evacuees into the

Ar~

in a sense altered the status

of eva cuees, since it placed them in closer proximity to the war effort,
indicating that the

Ar~

to J apanes e-Americans.

was adopting a more positive attitude in regard
The se gre gation of Minidokans on the basis of

loya lty weeded out the more antagonistic elements of the community but
did not entirely eliminate opposition to center management or mark an
end to disturbances.

lMinidoka Irrigator, J uly 31, 1943.
2Ibid., September 18, 1943.

CHAPTER VII
LIQUIDATION AND RESETTLEMENT
One of the major functions of the centers was to reloc ate the
eva cuees on a permanent basis.l This operation was designed to return
J ap anese - Americans to civilian life, and at the same time reduce the
number of evacuees living in relocation centers .

The indefinite leave

program had a slow start at Minidoka, because of the confusion that
was prevalent during the early months and the red tape involved in
securing a relea se.

Before an indefinite leave permit was issued, it

was necess ary for the FBI, the WRA, and the Military Intelligence to
cle ar a pro spective applicant.
he

\iS S

Once a resident had obtained a release,

free to relocate a.ny>mere in the United States, outside of cer-

t a in restricted military areas which included the West Coast.

Evacuee

families leaving the center were eligible for a subsistence allowance
that helped defray expenses until they were proper ly situated.

Leave

grants 1rere based on family size and need, but they were held to a bare
minimum.

There ;rere various 1;ays that a resident could receive a leave
clearance.

Educational rele ases were granted to Nisei college stu-

dents who wanted to continue their education.

Residents who enlisted

or were drafted i nto t he ArT111f 11ere given an indefinite leave status.

1 Inf'orl!l!ltion f'or this chapter was derived from the following ·
sources: Minidoka Irri.e:ator; "WRA Registration and ArT111f Voluntooring,"
Minidoka Report No. 57, April . 7, 1943.
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Also permanent leave grant s could be obtained by colonists desiring
to \<ork on the outside.
number of relocatees.

The l ast category constituted the largest
By September of 1944, 4,150 residents had left

the center for an indefinite period of timc. 1
As a result of the indefinite leave pro gram, the exodus and arrival of seasonal workers, as well as the arri val of the Tuleans, the
population of the center fluctuated violently from month to month as
the following diagram indicates:

Table 4.

Monthl;r PoEul e.tion from October of 1942 to December of 1944. a

1942
October •
November
December

1944

1943
8,311
7,597
8, 438

January
Fe bruary
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October •
November
December

9 ,091
9,274
9.375
9,152
8,351
7,801
7,666
7, 183
7,164
8, 175
6,923
8,595

January
February
March
April
May •
June
July
August
Septembe r
Octobe r •
November
December

aWar Relocation Authority, Seventh Semiannual Report, July
December 31 , Washington D. 0., 1944. P• 50 ·

8 ,964
8,784
p.

.'549

8,333

7 ,799
7,250
7,058
6 , 842
6 ,930
6,510

6 ,697
7,297
to

It will be noticed that, over a period of two years (October of 1942 to
December of 1944) the reloc ation r ate was not sufficient enough to drastically
reduce the popul ation.

It became obvious that if the center was to close

eventually, the indefinite le ave program would have to be great ly expanded .

1

l·linidoka Irrigator, September 16 , 1944.

Announcement of Liquidation
In the middle of Decembe r, 1944, the WRA announced that all re-

loc ation centers would be closed within a period of six months to one
year.

The ban preventing Japanese from returning to the We st Coast

was to be r aised on January 2, 1945•

Furthermore, in order to encour-

age resettlement, evacuees would be allowed in the future to leave the
centers without having to obtain special permits.

As this news came

unexpectedly, the complacency of the community was shattered.

Minidoka

residents we re suddenly faced with the fact that the WRA was preparing
to close the center.
The majority of the populace did not greet this news with enthusiasm.

Most of the able-bodied men had by this time left the center,

having joined the

Ar~

or found employment on the outside.

The remain-

ing Japanese consisted primarily of elderly people and children who
were ill-equipped to support themselves in civilian life.

They had

become adjusted to center living--a stagnant condition that tended to
weaken initiative--and, hence, many were reluctant to leave the security of the community.

The outside world seemed to have little to offer

them, a s they had already been dispossessed of their homes and property.
The effort that would be necessary to start life over again appeared
to be incredibly difficult in view of the hardships and prejudices which
confronted them.

Then there was the agonizing fear that if they dared

to return to their home towns on the West Co ast, they would be ostracized
from society.
A l a rge pe rcentage of the inhabitants were at first unconvinced
that the WRA actually intended to close the centers in the immediate
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future.

Those of: this opinion thought that the liRA s announcelll"nt
1

(that the centers would be closed) was an insidious threat designed
to pressure the evacuees into leaving the center.
was not to be taken seriously.

This threat, however,

Others believed that if: Minidoka were

closed, remaining evacuees would be transf:erred to some other relocation center.l

Some contended that the centers would eventually be turned

over to another government agency and continue to operate f:or an indefinite period of: time. 2

The administration vigorously denied these ru-

mors, but they were slow to die.

It took several months to convince

such rationalizers that the VRA was not bluf:f:ing.

Gradually the popu-

lace accepted the fact that the liquidation of the center was inevitable.
Termination of Services
During the months following the announcement that the centers would
be closed, the administration gradually suspended the operation of
various services and f:acilities .
ti al ly reduced.

The project l a bor force was substan-

The agricultural division was eliminated.

Vocational

training shops, and the elementary and secondary schools were closed
in May and June.

Activities in the community were curtailed while all

eff:orts were directed towards relocation.
prises were r e duced or eliminated.

Budgets f:or dif:f:erent enter-

Several mess halls were closed as

the population decreased due to the steady exodus of: relocatees.

The

l u.S.\'/.R.A. Collllm.Ulity Analysis Section , "Reactions in the Relocation Centers following Announcement of: West Coast Opening and Ultimate Center Closing, " June 21, 1945 • P• 1.
2Ibid., No. 28 , July 17, 1945- P• 1.
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Minidoka Irrigat or ceased to fUnction at the end of July.

Laundry,

bath, and toilet f acilities were closed when a block's population had
declined to a set minim..un.l
The rapid contraction of center activities had a profound effect
upon the community, thoroughly disrupting the routine of center life. 2
Management was often more concerned with efficiency than the welfare
of the people.

As a result essential services were sometimes di scon-

tinued to the severe inconvenience of the residents.

The gradual with-

drawal of center services had an adver se effect upon the morale of the
people, causing a g re at deal of protest and bitterness. ?

Liquidation

was considere d by many as a devious plot to render the community an
undesirable place to live, so that evacuees would be more willing to
make plans for resettlement.

While such notions prevailed, re sidents

were reluctant to cooperate with the administration, and as a result
the relocation program suffered.
Opposition to Relocat ion
Although a few reacted favorably to the liquidation and relocation policy, the general opinion >ras that the WRA was obligated to keep
the centers open until the outside situation >ras compatible with relocation.

Resettlement had been a voluntary enterprise, but now it appeared

as though the WRA was trying to coerce the eva cuees into le aving.

A

1
\~ R. A. Community Analysis Section, "Reactions in the Relocation
Centers fo1lo>ang .~ounce ment of West Co ast Opening and Ultimate Center
Clo sing, " June 21, 1945. P• 1.

u.S .. ..

2Letter from Jobu Yasumura, Re port on a visit to the Minidoka Relocation Center, Hunt, Idaho, October 15-23 , 1945, November 5, 1945. P• 5·
3Ibid .
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r epresentative gr oup of sixteen Issei, who >rere established leade rs
in the comm.mity, presented the Project Director with a statement >rhi ch
expressed their disapproval of forced rel ocation and the WRA' s plan to
c lose the center :
Early in t he evacuation stage, the Government announced that
fo r the pr otection of the evacuees themselves, it 1ril l retain
them in relocation centers f or the duration, and guarantee
them f ood , clothing , she lter, and a lso recreational and educational facilities. Despite t his promise , the Government
abandoned this original policy and be gan t o enforce a po l i cy
of pe rsuading evacuees to le ave t he centers and re sett le in
American communities. The existence of intense anti-Japanese feelings and its threat upon the personal s afety and
livelihood of the evacuees are well kno>rn to the authorities in charge of the evacuees' welfare . Despite those and
othe r unfavorab le circumstances, the Governnrnt , acting through
the WRA, has undertaken t o impose upon the evacuees a policy
of sp rinkling t hem unnoticeab l y across the length and breadth
of the country.l
Reports and rumors filtered into the cente r to the effe ct that
anti -Japanese sentiment was still vridespread a long the 11e st Co ast, and
actual a ccounts of J apane se terrorized by hatemongers reinforced t he
conviction that relocation 11ould be a hazardous undertaking. 2

In June

of 1945, an editorial appeared in the community paper whi ch reve a led
the dismay of the popul ace over such occurrences:
As in the present situation since the re s ci nding of the
West Coa st ban, some of us are fri ghtened by the ne>rs
stories that appear >lith surprising regularity in the
co ast pape rs concerning the ho stility of the residents
the re. 11e are fri ghtened and sometimes r ather hurt and
baffled by the se stories, because once upon a time >re
used to know these same people. 3

1ua r R~io~~tion Autho rity , Impounded People--Story of Life in the
Relocation Centers, 1946. P• 146.
2u.s . \·I.R .A. Community Analysis Section , Weekl y Summary No. 15,
March 25, 1945. P• 3•
3vdni doka Irrigator, June 13, 1945.

Alth ough the admini stration tried to reassure the residents that
anti-Japane se agit ation

>~a s

not severe enough to impede resettlement,

Ninidokan s were decidedly impressed by such reports.

Stories of mis-

treated reloc atees were well circulated in the center, and they 11ere
interpreted by many a s evidence that the public was still un>nlling
to accept them.
Resistance towards relocation came mainly from the Issei.

Re-

location held little promise for them, since outside opportunities were
re served for the young and vigorous .

This attitude was expressed by

one Minidokan in a statement which reflects the feeling of apprehensiveness that was prevalent amongst the elderly Japanese:
Y/e a re 4o , 50, 60, 70 years old, can we go and take up the
lo ad of young men, and again go through what we did in 19001920? Oan we stand to get low wages, be the first fired
and l a st hired because of our race and color? We can't
protect ourselves and law enforement people won't give a
1
damn about us •
It was difficult for the administration to combat this argt.IID"nt effectively, and the Issei remained obstinate until the very end.

Al-

though the young Japanese in many i n st ances were anxious to relocate,
their parents were not easily convinced that resettlement was particularly desirable. 2
The Relocation Movement
Early efforts to encourage large scale relocation failed, l a r gely
because the approach used by center management created a great deal
of resentment.
come.

Opposition towards resettlement was difficult to over-

Attempts on the part of the administration to encourage reloca1u.s.w.R.A. Community Analysis Section, No. 28, July 17,1945. P• 1.
2r bid., Weekly Summary No. 2) , June 6, 1945. P• 1.

~· .
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tion

•~re

interpreted by many as subtle t actics to force unwilling

evacuees into leaving the center.
Several devices were used by the administration to convince the
popul ace that immediate resettlement was to their better interest.
Information concerning relocation was disseminated by various methods.
Bulletins l<ere posted in the mess halls and numerous articles appeared
in t he project

ne>~spaper,

all of which stressed the necessity of making

preparations for leaving the center and the numerous opportunities that
were avai l able on t he outside.

The WRA director, Dillon

~er,

visited

the center and lectured on the positive aspects of resettlement, attempting to dispel fears of the outside world and to minimize the
extent of anti-Japanese sentiment.l

Meetings were conducted to em-

pha size further the advisability of relocation.

The Relocation Divi-

sion interviewed evacuees who planned to leave the center, discussing
problems and making arrangements for anyone who desired to leave .

The

relocation office listed numerous jobs in different parts of the country,
offering evacuees some choice in the selection of an occupation and
place of residency.
Most Minidokans resented this bombardment of propaganda.

Multi-

f arious techniques employed by center management to step up the rate
of r elocation failed to effect a significant change in attitude.
Information bulletins listing employment opportunities >tere read Iii th
skepticism.

Administration-sponsored meetings designed to educate the

popula ce on the subject of re settlement >tere poorly attended.

Japanese

proved hesitant to discuss their relocation plans with administrative

libid. , Weekly Summary No. 10, February, 1945. P• 1.
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personnel due to a general feeling of distrust.

Information that was

considered reliable by evacuees in regard to relocation was usually
derived f'rom reports of Japanese visitors who were familiar 1-rith the
outside situation.

News articles and letters from relocated friends

were also held to be valid sources.
Although the majority of the residents preferred to remain in
the center, Minidoka's population gr adually declined during the months
following the lifting of the West Coast ban .

From January, 1945, to

July, 1945, the population decre a sed by approximately 2,500.

The fol-

lowing table indic ates the extent of the population decline from January, 1945, to November, 1945:

Population Decline, 1945.a

Table 5.
January
February
March
April
May •
Jun"

7 ,4?9
7 ,)14
7,117
6,722
6,26?
5,496

aEighth Semi-Annua l \'IRA Report.

July •
August •
September
October
November •

4, 819
4,244
),167
1,467
none

p. 67.

It will be noted from the preceding chart that the relocation rate
greatly increased during the last three months of the center's existence.
This was due mainly to a new policy initiated by the administration
which r adical ly changed the resettlement program.
Forced Relocation and Final Liquidation
In the middle of July the WRA announced that ¥dnidoka was scheduled to

~lose

on November 1, 1945.

In order to meet this deadline,
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the relocation program was pushed to the extreme, and center management
l aunched a final program intended to complete the liquidation process.
Although t he administration had been aggressive in its efforts to
expedite re settlement, it became obvious that unless stern measures
were emp loyed, a recalcitrant minority would refUse to
September of

1945,

rel ~ cate.

By

three thousand residents were still in t he center,

and many had no intention of leaving .!

In order to insure fulfillment

of t he clo sing dea dline, the \·IRA supplied local project directors with
a J<e apon (Administrative Notice 289 ) that ena bled cente r management to
evict anyone who wa s unwilling to le ave.

Minidoka residents were in-

formed t hat t his decre e would be enforced whenever necessary .

Natura l-

ly, t he Japanese resented such thre ats, but it \•tas apparent that resistance would be futile.
Center management was hesitant to serve eviction notices, being
inclined to favor a policy whereby evacuees \<auld be required to make
definite plans for relocation.

The intended goal was to have everyone

select a departure date that would conform to an evacuation schedule,
thus preventing a last-mhnrte exodus that would invariably lead to chaos.
Residents

\~re

divided into three categories, according to their prox-

imity to relocation.

The "A" group included those l<ho had made definite

plans and had agreed to a specific date of departure.

The

11

B11 group

consisted of those who were planning to relocate but had not determined
when they were going to leave.

The last group, the

•c•

group , contained

the rest of the residents--those who had made no plans at all.
"B" people were re quired to select a departure date, while the
was t old to make immediate plans.

lNinth Semiannual WRA Report.

p.

46.

The

•c•

group
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In September, a aeries of meetings
the "B" and "C" groups .

>~ere

held specifically for

Attendance was compulsory.

Colonists were

informed that i f relocat ion plans were not made voluntarily, the administration would send notices warning them that they had two weeks
in >mich to se lect a departure date.

If after two weeks they still

refused to set a date, center management would present them with an
ultimatum, wherein they would be gi ven three days to leave t he center.
Those

·~ o

ignor ed this order were to be forcefully evicted.

By applying extreme pressure, the administration was able to effeet the evacuation of Minidoka on schedule .

More t h an ),000 evacuees

left the center dur ing the l ast month of its existence.

Although a

few die-hard re sident s had to be evicted, t he vast majority cooperated
(outward ly at le ast ) 1 and no overt acta of defiance detained closing
procedure.

The l ast groups to leave consisted of old men and women,

small children, and a few hospital case s.

Care was taken by the staff

to assist those who needed help in preparing for final departure.
center

~<as

The

closed on October 25 , 1945 , eight days ahead of schedule.

The fina l liquidation program was executed in an orderly f ashion,
but the feeling s of the bewildered evacuees, who viewed civilian life
with tre pidation , \to re coldly sacrifi cod during the proce as .
The vast majority of Minidoka's inha bitant s did not return to
their home towns in Oregon and Wa shington.

It was apparent that anti-

Japanese sentiment prevailed on the West Coast ; therefore they sought
homes elsewhere .

Minidokans did not set tle in any one particular area

but dispersed all over the United States.

I

___•..rI

SUMMARY
By all external appearances it seemed as though the inhabitants
of Minidoka had been able to adjust favorably to center life, and
that they were reasonably satisfied With the way in which they had
been treated.

Their response to various programs showed that they

were willing to contribute to the success of the community.

Co-

operation between colonists and center management seemed to indicate
that relocation had not resulted in extensive bitterness.

Hardships

had been accepted with a minimum of complaints, while demonstrations
or social disturbances were practically unknown.
however, tend to be misleading.

These observations,

In actuality Minidokans were frustrated,

insecure, and intensely worried about their future.

The following

comments upon center l ife, written by discontented residents, support
this conclusion.

lie who are in relocation centers sometimes . feel as if we
have any rights left or not [si~. According to t he trend
of events, we feel that we have been kicked around a little bit too much • • • grievances concerning the evacuation, restrictions placed upon us concerning the places we
may go, questions concerning our loyalty to the U. S.,
\'Then in our minds we are absolutely sure of our loyalties
• • • rise to the surface and we become confused as to
the rea l issues at stake .l
Here, despite the calmness and the apparent complacent
appearance on the surface, a thousand and one t hought s are
running like the currents in a r iver . • • • Reading Hearstian newspapers and mulling over threadbare ideas sprinkled
with a large dosage of a feeling of persecution and race

!Minidoka Irrigator, February 26, 1944.

82
consciousne ss breeds uncertainty and fear in
of a peop le who do not have the benefit of a
ebbing >10rld. Day after day, faced with the
which does not' seem to have a solution, soon
the mind to the po int of fru stration and one
with stagnation and hopele ssness.

the minds
flowing,
situation
poisons
soon reels

It is difficult to eva luate ac curat e ly the consequences of relocation or the long-t erm effect it had on the dislocated Japanese families.

Reloc ation and center life,

ho~<ever,

apparently had a profound

influence u pon the ,impressionable younger J apanese generation, helping
to break down close family relationships and ha stening the Americanization of J apanese youths .

One

~linidoka

girl explained that this process

occurred as a result of barracks living conditions, which "allowed the
you ~ger

group to be more American in their thinking, and to get further

away from the ol de r, parent al influence of a J apane se code of living.• 2
It was hard for the Nipponese culture to remain unaltered under such
circumstances .
Harry Stafford, Minidoka's Project Director, was intimately connected with the problems associated with the ordeal of relocation.
Upon the t e rmination of hi s career >nth the WRA he made a statement
which seems to summarize the who1.e tragic episode; "I believe the
r amifications of evacuation, incarceration, re loc ation, and re settlement to have been a most unfortunate experience for evacuees and
Government a like. •3 This governmental action has been judged unduly
h arsh by a l ater generation.

Although it is in retrospect a st ain

on the honor of the United States, it becomes understandable, and
indee d, inevita ble when vie wed in the light of the social sit uation
and hi storical events 1<hich prece ded it .
lMi~~~ka Irrigator, June 24,

1944.

2sa lt Lake Tribune, July 4, 1943 •
.?stafford, Harry, "Project Director 1 s Narrative, • ~!ini doka Re locati on Center, Hunt , Idaho. P• 10.
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